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4The origin story of the essay as a form is perhaps familiar: in the late 
sixteenth century Michel Eyquem de Montaigne took the word from 
the French essayer, “to try,” to describe the writing with which he was 
experimenting in his retirement from political life: roaming, curious, 
digressive; associative, critical (most of all of his own ideas and percep-
tions), and deeply, devotedly engaged with the self, the world, and the 
self in the world. Since that first volume of Essais in 1580, the essay has 
been defined, written, read, and redefined over and over again across 
the continents. For some it is a free, ecstatic way to explore the self; for 
some it participates in describing the fabric of a nation; for some it is 
an urgent intellectual and political force; for others its critical, playful 
essence resists definition, and in so resisting, resists totalization. For all, 
it is, as the essayist Gabriel Zaid puts it, “the laboratory itself, where life 
is put to the test in a text.” 
We celebrate here excellence in that rich diversity of writing that tests 
the world and its ideas, engages critically both with the received and 
the new, and works in prose through urgent and complex arguments, 
thoughts, and perceptions. The essays in essay represent only a small 
portion of the fine critical writing here at Pomona College; we honor 
these for their critical insight, analytic precision, and rhetorical force, 
as well as for their playfulness, daringness, and willingness to experi-
ment. The essays in this special issue honor work that Pomona Col-
lege students completed in the Fall 2016 ID1 seminars. As the journal 
moves forward, each fall issue of essay will feature essays written in the 
previous fall semester’s ID1 seminars.
The ID1 essays represented in this volume go through a rigorous selec-
tion process: they are nominated by faculty members teaching ID1, the 
first-year Critical Inquiry Seminar at Pomona College. They are then 
read by a group of the Writing Partners working in the College’s Writ-
ing Center and narrowed down to a small selection of finalists. Finally, 
Foreword
by Kara Wittman & Pam Bromley
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5the winning papers and the honorable mentions are selected by the 
Writing Program faculty. We would like to thank all of those individu-
als involved in the process, and to thank as well the writers represented 
in this inaugural volume. Without further ado, then, we are delighted 
to introduce this issue of essay: critical writing at pomona college.
Friday, April 27, 2018
Claremont, California
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6In Knead of 
Interpretation: Reimagining 
Marie Clements’ post-dramatic 
play Burning Vision through the 
interpretive signpost of bread.
by Zed Alexander Hopkins 
The rise of post-dramatic performance has caused a monumental shift 
in the relationship between the audience and the dramatic text. The 
theatrical form is no longer poised on the assumptions of audience 
passivity and structured narrative, but instead relies on the “percip-
ience” of the audience in their individual “quest for coherent mean-
ing” (Fenton 108). While this new era of “formlessness” has given 
birth to new possibilities within theatre, it has also created a sense of 
“interpretive anxiety” for the audience—that is, an anxiety derived 
from the complexity of the evolving dramatic text and the overwhelm 
that such complexity can induce (Fenton). Marie Clements’ ecolog-
ically focused post-dramatic play Burning Vision manifests much of 
this anxiety through a heavily fragmented narrative structure and a 
multifaceted socio-historical context. As a director trying to treat this 
anxiety as it is imposed onto the audience, David Fenton suggests 
that the theatrical device of signposts can be used (84). Mokotow 
defines signposts as “the use of a sign or symbol to help remind [the 
audience] of the ideas at hand”. Clements masterfully writes many 
visual and symbolic signposts into her work, the most notable of 
such being that of bread. The following discussion explores the ways 
in which the signpost of bread functions within Burning Vision as a 
counterweight to the interpretive anxiety that Clements deliberately 
stimulates in an attempt to guide the audience toward some form of 
catharsis.
At its most basic level, the signpost of bread functions as a didactic re-
7
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7flection of character. Most notably Clements uses bread to bring focus 
to the dramatic weight of Fat Man’s character. He is quite possibly the 
most obscure and confusing character within this piece. The inter-
pretive anxiety that is generated by Fat Man’s narrative is primarily 
engendered by his unimpassioned tone and fragmented narrative arc. 
However, it seems that this feeling of uncertainty in relation to Fat 
Man has been deliberately pursued by Clements in an attempt to sub-
ject him to the audiences’ subconscious metonymy. His hyper-realistic 
references to “beer,” “Kraft dinners,” and his “living room soldier” 
ideals create an image of a man (or nuclear-test dummy) who is so 
unpalatable to the audience that they objectify him by categorizing 
him as the objects with which he is so absorbed. His being a nuclear 
test dummy furthers this disassociation with the human form, mak-
ing him unrelatable or in many cases unreachable for most audience 
members—thus producing interpretive anxiety.  
The treatment of this anxiety is seen quite clearly through the role 
of bread as a reflective signpost. This anxiety is treated primarily 
through the association of Fat Man’s image with other images of the 
play to create contrast and juxtaposition. Drawing on David Fen-
ton’s suggestion that signposts should be represented as palimpsests 
(83—that they must create in themselves an intertextuality with the 
other moments of the play—we can see a resonance between Fat Man 
and Rose. Clements uses the reoccurring image of bread to create a 
didactic representation of human growth, by juxtaposing these two 
characters. While we are led to accept the fact that Fat Man is in 
reality a ‘test-dummy’ and not human, we see Rose as a near-realist 
archetype for a working-class women. The two timelines blend deli-
cately through Clements’ weaving of narrative progressions, creating 
a unified representation of what we might consider the ‘American 
condition.’ We see Rose described as a “perfect loaf of bread” (Clem-
ents, 2003), representing the admirable ‘ingredients’ of the American 
culture. Conversely, Fat Man is a product of capitalist ideology, a mix-
ture of the American culture of consumption and conformity, repre-
senting the more corrosive ‘ingredients’ which compose our American 
identity. Clements frames both of these characters’ stories within close 
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8proximity to each other for this exact reason; enticing the audience to 
view the full breadth of our American identity.
In understanding this we can see a parallel between Rose’s opening 
scene and Fat Man’s. In Rose’s opening scene we are introduced to 
the importance of bread in Rose’s life and the ingredients that are 
essential for it to rise in the oven, while Fat Man’s opening scene 
depicts him standing in a monochromatic living room, appreciating 
his television and La-Z-Boy chair (the ingredients that make up his 
life). The signpost of bread creates an association between the charac-
ters and also functions as a metaphor for American ideals. We can see 
how bread acts as the reoccurring identifier between sub-narratives, 
allowing the audience to draw parallels between characters and the 
socio-historical background they represent.
The next level of analysis leads us to view bread as a symbol for com-
modification, finding the liminal spaces within sub-narratives in an 
attempt to evolve the play’s social commentary. The roots of this play 
are built on a hierarchy of commodity: from the initial trade-offs of 
gold for the LaBine Brothers and bread for the Indians, to the exhaus-
tion of environmental and human capital to extract the precious ore, 
this play seems to be littered with allusions to capitalist hierarchy. It is 
once again the complexity of the overlapping timelines and the sheer 
variety of commodities referred to throughout the play that generate 
the anxiety of Clements’ map of socially charged imagery. Clements 
often references food resources, fish, touch, love, and life as separate 
commodities within the text. 
However, superficially, she gives the audience no way to sort or cat-
egorize the relevance of these images. We see the Miner and the Ra-
dium Painter exchange both love and touch in a similar way to Rose 
and Koji, while also being exposed to images of commodity exchange 
in the form of business, consumption, and power. Yet we still cannot 
identify these images as symbols for broader meaning. The signpost 
of bread acts more like cement than an overarching symbol between 
these fragmented images in that it guides the audience’s focus without 
feeding them the answers. In these circumstances, the image of bread 
9
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9creates a parallelism between humanity and its commodities. The final 
image of the play catalyzes this realization in its depiction of several 
human characters turning into sacks of flour. This moment makes a 
wide array of symbolic suggestions, most simplistically attributing a 
human quality to bread and further implying that humans are being 
used as commodities under the capitalist ideals represented by the 
LaBine Brothers. Furthering this, bread acts as a unifying symbol for 
commodity and the way our commodities define us as individuals. 
This is exemplified in the parallel between Rose’s obsession with bread 
and the Widow’s obsession with her dead husband’s clothes. It is as 
if these commodities become a part of the characters (as do many of 
the other commodities within the play). Like our own flesh, bread 
becomes a symbol for how commodities are a part of us. This in itself 
also comes to represent another range of ‘ingredients’ that make up 
each character’s social perspective. 
Going further, we see Clements using bread to signpost a deeper 
critique of the ignorance within a capitalist society, wherein the 
lower classes are left misinformed and misrepresented. An excellent 
example of this is when Rose says that “there’s no harm if [dust] gets 
in dough,” reflecting her inability to comprehend the true damage 
caused by uranium extraction. The generous and kind gesture of bak-
ing becomes a process of accidental poisoning. This image of bread 
as a matter that absorbs from its environment links to the ‘Radium 
Painter’ who is unknowingly killing herself by painting watches for 
the war effort. The signpost of bread continues to uncover a blissful 
ignorance that ultimately leads the audience to one of the most pro-
found realizations of the play: that they, like bread, are commodities 
to those who are above them in the social hierarchy. 
The final layer to the signpost of bread is its ability to inspire a genu-
ine empathetic connection between the audience and the characters 
onstage. While the uniqueness and dramatic complexity of the play’s 
characters is praiseworthy, their overlapping presence and complete 
separation from the common stereotypes of contemporary realism 
aggravate audiences’ interpretive anxiety. Superficially, many of these 
characters are near-impenetrable by the audience’s gaze alone, requir-
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ing an evolving association with the piece’s thematic structure to be 
understood—even more so if they are to be empathized with. This 
is not to say that these characters are inaccessible to the audience, 
but merely that they work against the audience’s preconceptions of a 
character-audience relationship. This is largely due to the diversity of 
the cast and their non-linear timelines, which in their very nature are 
implemented to disorientate. 
In overcoming this anxiety, the signpost of bread seems to attribute 
significance to the moments within all of the characters’ sub-nar-
ratives that resemble one other. One of the most profound of these 
resemblances is Rose’s moment of obsessive bread preparation and the 
Widows’ obsessive stare into the flames as she holds her husband’s re-
maining clothes. The miscellaneous timelines of these two characters 
become opposing life cycles as one women awaits her time to join her 
husband on the other side of the flame and the other prepares to bake 
bread for her lover from that same flame. It is in this coincidental as-
sociation that we see the true weight of these characters and their role 
within the opposing narrative arc. These moments show how each 
character reflects every other, suggesting that their individual ‘reci-
pes’ have been constructed with similar ‘ingredients.’ The signpost of 
bread acts as a metaphor for humanity in the way that it encapsulates 
the stories of each of these characters, framing them as products of a 
flawed and corrupt system, longing for something more. It is through 
this realization that the audience finds clarity in these characters and 
their interwoven timelines. The layered association of meaning invites 
the audience to look into their own feelings of longing and purpose, 
thus stimulating an empathetic vulnerability toward the characters.  
The true weight and dramatic value of the interpretive anxiety stimu-
lated by the post-dramatic form can be validated only by the effective 
implementation and expression of signposts. In Burning Vision, the 
use of bread as a multi-functional signpost allows the audience to 
overcome the sometimes fallacious and numbing effects of interpre-
tive anxiety. Bread is applied as a didactic reflection of character, a 
symbol for commodification and an overarching metaphor for human 
connectivity. Inevitably the culmination of these functions sheds light 
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Zed Alexander Hopkins ‘20 submitted this paper in Fall 2016 for Professor 
James Taylor’s ID1 course, Our Troubled World Imagined: Theatre and the 
Environment. It is one of the three papers that received honorable mention 
from that semester.
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on a deceptively well-crafted and complex signpost that is and will 
continue to be at the crux of future readings and renditions of this 
play.
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Chinese Speakers in 
America: Diglossia as Style
by Kang (Franco) Liu 
The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China defines China as a 
tongyi duominzu guojia, a “united country with diverse nationalities.” 
Here, “nationality” refers to minzu, an ethnic group with a common 
territory, history, culture, and sometimes even language different from 
those of other groups. Amongst 56 such ethnic groups across China, 
the Han are nationally recognized as the only majority, taking up 
91.51% of the national population, while the other 55 are considered 
ethnic minorities (National Bureau of Statistics). The Constitution 
further states that all minzu are equal and enjoy equal status and inde-
pendent administrative rights within respective autonomous regions. 
Such constitutional provisions, as reflected in national policies, grant 
ethnic groups the latitude to preserve their distinct language cultures, 
under the consensus of a united Chinese national identity. However, 
for the Chinese-speaking Han people, linguistic diversity within their 
cultures has been largely trivialized and suppressed by Chinese lin-
guistic hegemony.
In fact, “Chinese” is not a monolithic linguistic entity but rather an 
umbrella term that includes all variations of the Han Chinese lan-
guage. Such variations are mostly regional, often provincial, and are 
therefore named fangyan, meaning “regional speech,” or “dialect.” 
Since 1912, due to the mutual unintelligibility between most dialects, 
numerous phonetic schemes have been developed by the Committee 
for the Unification of Pronunciation, under the Ministry of Educa-
tion. These schemes aim to facilitate the standardization of a unified 
spoken language, better communication across regions, and project 
a united national identity (Zhang 565). In 1932, the Beijing dia-
lect became officially recognized as the basis for the national spoken 
language, later named Putonghua (Mandarin). The new standard 
pronunciation, from then on, was defined as “the speech of natives of 
13
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Beijing who have received a middle-school education,” and was fur-
ther endorsed by obligatory school education and Putonghua Shuiping 
Ceshi, or the Mandarin Proficiency Test (DeFrancis 76). 
This decision to bring the Beijing dialect to the fore requires Chinese 
speakers to conform to Beijing Mandarin phonology, which includes 
erhua, or rhotacization. Since such linguistics features are only na-
tive to speakers of Beijing dialect and some other Northern Chinese 
varieties, promotion of such linguistic features puts speakers of other 
Chinese varieties at a disadvantage as they have to learn the prescribed 
usage of an unfamiliar dialect to be understood outside their original 
speech communities (Zhang). Therefore, under the Chinese language 
policy, upbringing and habitation in certain regions presuppose access 
to particular language resources exclusive to said regions, and such 
access is oftentimes bound by inequality (Dong 6).
Following the standardization process and the government’s endorse-
ment of Mandarin as the national spoken language, China Daily 
reported in 2004 that 53.06% of the Chinese population is able to 
speak Mandarin to some extent, and according to the Ministry of 
Education in 2004, the percentage climbs to 80.44% in major prov-
inces. The gradual rise of Mandarin as well as the remaining varia-
tions in different regions and ethnic groups all point to diglossia as a 
prominent feature of Chinese multilingualism. The term “diglossia” 
describes multilingualism occurring at a societal scale. It refers to the 
language situation in which at least two varieties of a language coexist 
in one linguistic culture and share domains of linguistic behavior in 
a complementary distribution (Schiffman 116). This distribution of 
language varieties is also stratified, and within said distribution, the 
domains involved in the speech community are ranked from high 
varieties (H) to low varieties (L) (Fishman). Domains such as public 
speaking, education or other prestigious usage are categorized as H 
varieties, whereas conversations, jokes, and other informal discourses 
are L varieties. To better illustrate the linguistic relationship between 
H- and L-domains in Han Chinese, I reference Fishman’s taxonomy 
of language varieties  and adapt it to the diglossic situation of the 
Chinese language (Table 1).
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Table 1: Distribution of H- and L-variety domains in modern China.
H / L Variety Domain
H Standard Mandarin
higher education
journalism
(international) media
public events
L Regional dialects
home
school
local
street
country areas
businesses
local media
In such a taxonomy, both varieties are genetically related to each 
other. The H variety, Mandarin, is categorized as written or for-
mal-spoken usage. The L variety, regional dialects, marks Mandarin 
as the language of the more powerful section of the society and thus 
contributing to the Mandarin hegemony of the Chinese language 
(Schiffman). 
To trek deeper into the influence of Mandarin hegemony on Chinese 
speakers of L varieties, I conducted ethnographic interviews over the 
phone with three Chinese speakers, two of whom are female.1 The 
two female interviewees are originally from northeast China. The 
third interviewee is a male from Nanjing, a city located in southern 
China. All three have personally gone through domestic (internal) 
and international (external) migration that resulted in their language 
shift. On the facing page (Transcript 1) is a partial transcription of my 
interview with Song,2 the male interviewee from Nanjing.3
1 Most of the data for this paper were aggregated through interviews conducted 
mainly in Chinese, and were then transcribed in Chinese first and translated into 
English. To preserve the authenticity of our interactional exchanges in Chinese, the 
original Chinese data are presented first alongside my English translation in this 
paper.
2  All names have been anonymized to protect the interviewees’ privacy.
3  I initiated this sociolinguistics research project with an interest in proving a widely 
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Transcript 1: Excerpt from interview with Song.
1 Song: 我老家是黄桥*的。小学才转到南京的。
I grew up in my hometown, Huangqiao. I moved to Nanjing when I was 
in elementary school.
2 Intvr: 哦OK。那你会讲老家那边的方言么？
Oh OK. Then do you know how to speak the dialect in your hometown?
3 Song: 会、会吧。我其实不总说都要忘了、只是和爷爷奶奶说话的时候
才说。
Yeah, probably. To be honest, I almost forget how to speak the dialect 
because I don’t speak it very often, only when I talk to my grandparents.
4 Intvr: 那你都说什么{方言}啊？你不说南京方言也不{总}说老家方言。
Then what {dialect} do you speak usually? You don’t speak Nanjing dia-
lect, nor do you speak Huangqiao dialect [very often].
5 Song: 我基本上就说普通话。当时从小学起开始学的。
I basically only speak Mandarin. Since I started learning Mandarin at 
elementary school.
6 Intvr: {普通话}和老家的方言差别大么？
Is {Mandarin} very different from your dialect?
7 Song: 嗯、挺大的。我记得当时学的特别费劲。最主要不学的话{我}也
没法跟别人交流啊。同学当时还笑话我、但是现在都习惯{说普通
话}了。[…]在我爸妈在南京工作一段时间之后也开始说普通话、
在家我们也基本上不说老家的方言了。
Yeah, very different. I remember it was very difficult to learn. What’s most 
important is that {I} can’t communicate with anybody if I don’t know 
Mandarin. My classmates used to mock me, but now I’m used to {the 
language}. […] My parents also learned how to speak Mandarin after 
working in Nanjing for a while, we basically don’t speak dialect at home 
anymore.
reported trend that my generation of young Chinese students, especially female 
ones who pursue higher education in more developed urban areas or foreign coun-
tries, tend to abandon their native tongue, and thus conducted most interviews 
with female peers. However, as the interview process progressed, my data started to 
drift away from the original research question and revealed more interesting facts 
about Chinese linguistics landscape from the particular perspective of Chinese 
students overseas; that’s when I decided to include another male speaker, Song, into 
the interview process.
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In the interview, Song shared with me his experience of learning a 
more standard way of speaking and relegating his native tongue to a 
secondary linguistic resource. In line 7, he voices the personal strug-
gles and limits on social communication caused by his dialect when 
he first moved to a more urbanized city, Nanjing (“can’t communicate 
with anybody,” “classmates used to mock me”). As evinced in his 
account, his regional dialect led to marginalization and even stig-
matization as he entered a new speech community where Mandarin 
dominates the speech community. His physical migration therefore 
becomes an upward migration in the hierarchy of Chinese diglossia, 
indicating how regional speech communities are also stratified, similar 
to diglossia framework, given the different linguistic resources within 
these communities. The mockery from his classmates also informs us 
of the ideology of inferiority carried by L varieties under the Manda-
rin hegemony.
As I moved on with other interviewees, I came to realize the major 
difference between their narratives and Song’s. While Song’s language 
shift occurred as the result of internal migration (from a rural county 
to an urban city in Jiangsu province, China), others focused on their 
external migration experience, namely coming to the US for higher 
education, and how such an experience reshaped the way they wield 
their Chinese linguistic resources.
My second interviewee, Miao, was born and raised in Harbin, a city 
in northeast China. She is currently a freshman at a university in 
Virginia, and speaks Mandarin, Dongbei dialect (a Chinese variation 
spoken predominantly in Northeast China), and English. When she 
was in high school in Harbin, she used to juggle both Chinese vari-
eties in different domains: she would speak perfect Mandarin when 
delivering a speech as a student representative in public, and code-
switch back to her Dongbei dialect in front of her family and local 
friends. This compartmentalization in her Chinese language under 
different situations thus exemplifies and showcases her conscious 
knowledge of the previously-discussed distribution of Chinese variet-
ies. However, after two months in the US, she has transformed from 
a polyglot who maneuvers up and down the language hierarchy to a 
17
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monoglot of the Dongbei dialect (Transcript 2).
Transcript 2: Excerpt from interview with Miao.
1 Intvr: 现在在国外还讲中文么？
Do you still speak Chinese now that you’re in the US?
2 Miao: 讲啊。干啥不讲啊？还成天说东北话呢！
Sure. Why not? I also speak Dongbei dialect all the time!
3 Intvr: 真的么？跟中国学生么？
Really? With Chinese students?
4 Miao: 啊呗。
Yeah
5 Intvr: 那他们能听懂你说东北话么？
Can they understand your dialect?
6 Miao: … 能吧、我管他们呢。他们好像还觉得挺逗的。
… Probably, I don’t care. They seem to find it funny somehow.
7 Intvr: 我感觉我都好久不说东北话了。因为在Pomona大家都说普通话
I feel like I haven’t spoken Dongbei dialect since forever. Because Chinese 
people here at Pomona all speak Mandarin.
8 Miao: 因为我想说啊。
Because I want to.
9 Intvr: 啊？
Huh?
10 Miao: 在这儿的中国女生儿开口就台湾腔！就… 贼傻逼！贼嗲！还矫
情！我可受不了、我怕被他们给我拐跑喽！
Other Chinese girls here speak Chinese with a Taiwanese accent! It’s… 
super stupid! Super dia! And pretentious! I can’t stand it, I don’t want 
their accent to influence mine!
Of note is her use of Dongbei phrases and words: 干啥, gansha, why/
what, usually used when the speaker is annoyed or irritated; 成天, 
chengtian, all the time/all day long; 啊呗, abei, yes; 管, guan, care; 贼, 
zei, very4; and 傻逼, shabi, stupid, stupid people; rather offensive. 
Beyond particular word choices, her pronunciations of other words 
mark her as a native Dongbei speaker. She pronounces 还 as hài, not 
4  This definition is unique to the Dongbei dialect. The word means thief in Man-
darin.
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hái as it is in Mandarin. The verb 觉得, to think, reckon, she pro-
nounces jiaode, true to the Dongbei dialect, as opposed to juéde, as it 
would be in Mandarin. Lastly, her dialect shows through her use of 
the Dongbei-specific hedge-word 就, jiu, a mitigating word to lessen 
the impact of her utterance so as to render her speech felicitous in a 
discourse. She explains the motive behind her intentional language 
shift in line 8 and 10—her fear of adopting a Taiwanese accent as she 
interacts with “other Chinese girls” at her university. Additionally, 
in line 10, Miao expresses a strong aversion towards the Taiwanese 
accent with a noticeably more emphatic speech pattern (sentence-lev-
el emphasis as transcribed by exclamation marks). Here, her remarks 
echo the attributes Taiwanese Chinese indexes under the Mandarin 
hegemony. To further illustrate such indexicality, here are two exam-
ples culled from a widely used dictionary of Mandarin and an ethno-
graphical research:
Example 1.
形容撒娇的声音或态度。 
Describes a voice or attitude of talking and acting likes a spoiled child or little girl.
“嗲” (dia). From the Dictionary of Standard Mandarin.
Example 2.
Almost half of them {participants of the research} describe Gang-Tai 2accent with an 
adjective “嗲” (dia). The adjective “嗲” was also associated with a sensation of soft, tender, 
girlish, sissy or cutesy by some of the respondents. Besides “嗲,” more than one third of 
the participants have an impression that other modal particles, especially when drawn long 
and spoken in a soft tone, are frequently used in Gang-Tai accent, such as “啦” (la), “嘛” 
(ma), “耶” (ye), “囉” (luo).
Lauren, & Yu-Tien. (2012). Chinese Teenagers Perceptions of and Attitudes toward Taiwan 
Mandarin. The University of Edinburgh.
Both examples on 嗲 (“spoiled child, sissy,” Example 1) and Miao’s 
word choices of 傻逼 (“stupid”) and 矫情 (“pretentious”) manifest the 
linguistic ideology under the hegemony, with which Chinese people 
form stereotypes about certain dialects and, by extension, their speak-
ers. Due to an influx of Taiwanese pop culture—in the form of TV, 
music (featuring mostly maudlin ballads), and reality shows—Chi-
nese people, especially teenagers, have begun to associate Taiwanese 
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Chinese speakers with the personalities of Taiwanese TV characters 
or singers and label them with ideologies in Example 2 (Yu-Tien 12).  
Miao never used the modal particles listed in Example 2, nor did she 
draw out her last syllables. Her linguistic performance of the Dong-
bei dialect stands in deliberate contrast to the Taiwanese accent in an 
attempt to construct her identity on a linguistically ideological level, 
one that steers clear of being labelled “stupid” or “pretentious.”
Xin, a 21-year-old female from Harbin5, voiced a similar intention 
to project a particular identity and differentiate herself from other 
Chinese students.
Transcript 3: Excerpt from interview with Xin.
1 Xin: […] 我在国外的时候特别爱说东北话！
[…] I love speaking Dongbei dialect when I’m in the US!
2 Franco: 为什么？
Why?
3 Xin: 因为… 就… 可能因为身边都是南方人吧{中国南方}。我得拿出
来点东北女汉子的气势来！
Because… it’s… probably because I’m surrounded by southern [Chi-
nese] people. I have to appear more masculine as a Dongbei heroine!
Xin shares the same language and education background as Miao, and 
here, demonstrates a similar linguistic performance of the Dongbei 
dialect—for instance, in her use of 就 as a hedge. She also articulates 
the reason for her language shift in line 3—to differentiate from 
her Southern Chinese schoolmates and to construct a “masculine,” 
“Dongbei heroine” identity. 
Example 3
哎呀妈呀，我还是女神？你可拉倒吧，我是一女汉子。
Oh my god, me, a goddess? You must be out of your mind. I am a female heroine. 
A female character in an 二人转 sketch titled《女神和女汉子》Goddess and Female 
Heroines.
Chinese Spring Festival Gala 2015
5  Harbin is a the provincial capital of Heilongjiang, a developing province in north-
east China.
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Example 3 is an excerpt from a 二人转, an errenzhuan, a form of 
sketch comedy with roots in Dongbei culture that is now a nationally 
popular comedy form. This particular sketch aired on national tele-
vision. The nationwide broadcasting of errenzhuan reflects the popu-
larization of Dongbei culture, and, specifically, the Dongbei dialect. 
Male characters in errenzhuan are usually self-sufficient farmers or 
unskilled laborers. Female characters, on the other hand, are mostly 
portrayed as hot-tempered housewives, yelling and cackling. Such 
performances, in general, invoke impressions—if not stereotypes—of 
Dongbei people, thereby indexing them and their language as “salt-
of-the-earth,” “humorous,” and “crude.” The term that Xin uses for 
“heroine” is 女汉子—a word which particularly signifies women who 
defy social expectations of femininity. It is now a widely-used neolo-
gism and can be directly linked to the use of the Dongbei dialect in 
the errenzhuan sketches airing on national television (“唉呀妈呀(oh 
my god)” and “拉倒(out of one’s mind)”). Xin’s choice to speak in 
the Dongbei dialect should therefore be interpreted as a performance 
in accordance with the social ideology that dictates the speech pat-
terns of a “heroine.”
In their decision to speak the Dongbei dialect, both Miao and Xin 
exhibit agency in their own experience of navigating through Chi-
nese diglossia in the US. They recognized the social saliency of their 
linguistic resources—in the form of the current popularity of Dong-
bei culture, exemplified by the errenzhuan—and further realized the 
indexical potentials of these resources to construct their own unique 
style amongst Chinese students. Their reference to neologisms and 
deeply-rooted linguistic ideologies also highlights the dialogic work 
of language. Linguistic resources at our disposal live “socially charged 
[lives]” and often carry tastes of their past uses and users (Bakhtin). 
Miao and Xin’s deployment of linguistic resources with imbued 
meanings is therefore a strategic move to ensure that their perfor-
mances, as well as their self-claimed identities, are recognized by 
others in order to distinguish themselves from other Chinese students 
(Butler). 
All three interviewees featured in this research paper are aware of their 
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Chinese diglossia as they negotiate and communicate their dominant 
identities in front of other Chinese speakers despite their different 
objectives. For Song, successful assimilation into the Mandarin-speak-
ing student body is a strategic move to gain power from speaking an 
H-variety Chinese language. His narrative allows us to examine, on 
an individual level, the presence and effect of the Mandarin hegemo-
ny in China, which favors H-variety speakers and dialects of central/
urban areas. Below are three other prime examples of this hegemony:
Example 4
字正腔圆 (zizheng qiangyuan). Standard pronunciation and smooth intonation. An 
idiom describing characteristics of Beijing dialect, also used to compliment one’s standard 
Mandarin pronunciation.
From the Dictionary of Standard Mandarin (Zhang, 2008).
Example 5
The use of the national common language and script shall be conductive to maintaining 
national sovereignty and dignity, be conductive to national integrity and unity, and be 
conductive to the construction of socialist material and spiritual civilization. [translation 
adapted from Rohsenow (2004, p. 41)]
From Article 5 of the Law of the National Commonly Used Language (Guojia Tongyong 
Yuyan Wenzi Fa).
Example 6
说普通话,写规范字,做文明人,扬爱国情。Speak Mandarin; Write Standard Chinese; 
Be civilized/educated; Be patriotic.
From the official slogan for “National Mandarin Promotion Week.”
In example 4, the fact that such a characterization of Beijing dialect is 
now considered as a criterion of desirable Mandarin speech illustrates 
the hierarchical structure of Chinese linguistic hegemony. Among all 
Chinese speech communities, dialects of urban centers are more pow-
erful, with the Beijing dialect being the most powerful, while those 
of rural and inland areas are often discriminated against (Dong 8). 
Under such a hegemony, Chinese language has increasingly become 
“amenable to redefinition as a measurable skill, as opposed to a talent, 
or an inalienable characteristic of group members” (Tan 345). The 
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nationalistic implication of said hegemony is also seen in example 
5 and 6, which connect linguistic competence in Mandarin to one’s 
“national integrity” and “spiritual civilization.”
For Miao and Xin, their choice to speak a certain dialect seems to 
be driven only by their desire to differentiate themselves from other 
Chinese speakers and to achieve new dominant identities, such as 
the “heroine.” In their narratives, the Chinese linguistic hegemony is 
apparent in their recounting of linguistic ideologies borne by differ-
ent Chinese varieties—for example, the perception of the Taiwanese 
accent as “stupid.” However, their migration away from China, the 
focus of where such hegemony operates, to the US, where no overar-
ching Chinese language policies exist, led them to orient towards the 
hegemony differently and deploy linguistic resources that would have 
otherwise been avoided. When immersed in an expatriated Chinese 
speech community, where English is used in most daily communi-
cation, Chinese comes to mean different things to its speakers as it 
becomes less associated with national identity or degree of civilization 
and more of a shorthand for interaction with other Chinese speakers. 
In this vein, their diglossia becomes a resource with which they per-
form a range of identities at their discretion, and the Dongbei dialect 
they know by heart starts to take on a stylistic potential that is no lon-
ger reduced to an L-variety, suppressed by national language policy.
23
et al.: Full Issue, Special Issue 2, Fall 2018
23
Notes: 
Transcription Conventions.
。 clause final (for Chinese Transcription)
. clause final (for English Transcription)
、 short pause (for Chinese Transcription)
, short pause (for English Transcription)
！ sentence-level emphasis
？ tag question or question intonation
… long pause
[ beginning of overlap
] end of overlap
{…} researcher’s comment
[…] researcher’s omission
@ laughter
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Food Fight: Violence and 
Exploitation in Fruit Still Life
by Aidan Maurstad 
Ori Gersht’s Pomegranate opens on several fruits arranged to mimic 
Juan Sánchez Cotán’s Still Life with Quince, Cabbage, Melon, and 
Cucumber, with Cotán’s quince noticeably replaced with a pomegran-
ate. Then, in slow motion, a bullet pierces the pomegranate, ripping it 
nearly in half. It is clear how the beginning of the video resembles still 
life: the fruits are physically ‘still’ and unmoving. However, the end 
of the video also resembles a still life, though it uses a different effect 
to create its ‘stillness.’ The video ends when the pomegranate is at the 
highest point on its pendulum swing, the moment perfectly between 
ascent and descent. In this way the pomegranate exhibits the vertige 
effect often found in still life paintings, in which fruits are suspend-
ed in some way so that, if time were allowed to move forward, they 
would fall. This is how the end of the video creates ‘stillness’: rather 
than the kinetic stillness of not moving, the end invokes a temporal 
stillness of being frozen in a single moment. Indeed, while the slow 
downward trickle of the few pomegranate seeds that remain at the 
video’s end might seem to negate the vertige effect, they in fact only 
add to it: the seeds give proof to the pull of gravity that the pome-
granate is defying. 
While both the beginning and end of the video cultivate a sense of 
‘stillness,’ the video’s use of sound sets up the end as the ‘true’ still 
life. For while, kinetically, the beginning of the video is perfectly still, 
it is accompanied with a low rumbling. This audio, preparing the 
viewer for the incoming bullet, gives the video a nervous animation, 
sabotaging its stillness. On the other hand, the end of the video is 
silent, a silence made conspicuous by the loud ‘whoosh’ of the bullet 
that precedes it. In this way, the beginning of the video feels like a 
pimple about to be popped, full of pressure and anticipation, while 
the end feels like a popped pimple, full of relief and stillness. The 
beginning still life then becomes what Harry Berger Jr. defines in his 
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book Caterpillage as a “McGuffin…a particular event, object, fac-
tor, etc. initially presented as being of great significance…but often 
having little actual importance” (2). Berger then borrows a metaphor 
from T.S. Eliot to compare the McGuffin to the “bone” thrown to the 
“watchdog of the mind” to distract the viewer of the painting from its 
“deeper business” (2). If the video’s beginning is its “McGuffin,” then 
the ending must reveal its “deeper business.”
The most convincing evidence that the end of the video is the true 
still life and the beginning is a “McGuffin” (2), and the evidence that 
reveals the “deeper business,” is the placement of the pomegranate. 
At the beginning of the video, the pomegranate is hung to the right 
of the cabbage. This is incorrect going by the model of the Cotán 
piece, as Cotán’s quince was hung to the left of the cabbage, forming 
a perfect downward arc through the fruit. The pomegranate, however, 
does assume its ‘true’ position at the end of the video, at the top of 
the pendulum swing created by the gunshot. Therefore, it can only 
be reasoned that the final frame of Gersht’s piece is the real still life, 
and the moments leading up to it are the still life’s creation, making 
the piece a sort of fruit-based snuff film. In this way, Gersht is saying 
Ori Gersht. Pomegranate, 2006. Video. The Jewish Museum.
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that fruit still life is built upon violence, that it is only through an act 
of overt violence that a still life can be made. Indeed, the snuff film 
aspect also gives the piece an air of voyeuristic exploitation, the idea 
that pleasure is being derived from the violence visited upon these 
fruits. This is the thread that runs through the paintings in this collec-
tion—violence is perpetrated on fruits so that they can be exploited 
for voyeuristic pleasure.
In contrast to the overt violence in the Gersht video, the violence 
in the Cotán original is much subtler. Indeed, at first glance, with 
a color scheme of mostly dull yellows and greens set against a black 
background, the piece looks a bit dour, even drab. The most obvious 
instance of violence can be seen with the slice of melon placed next 
to, assumedly, the melon it was taken from. This placement echoes 
something that Frank Palmeri identifies as a marker of violence in 
game still life paintings in his essay A Profusion of Dead Animals: Aut-
ocritique in Seventeenth-Century Flemish Gamepieces. When describing 
one painting, Palmeri points out how a dead boar exists “at the stage 
where the recognizable form of the animal coexists with the cuts of 
meat it is becoming” (1). It is easy to see how the melon and melon 
slice can be viewed in the same way as the boar and the cuts of meat, 
as, while many would identify a melon as food, slicing indicates that 
it was prepared, butchered even, and turned into a more recognizable 
food product.
However, the simple slicing of a melon is not an especially conspicu-
ous or out of the ordinary instance of violence in fruit still lifes. The 
more interesting instance of violence can be seen when looking at the 
melon slice in relation to the cucumber. Both are placed perilously far 
off the edge of the niche which contains the fruits. This placement is 
an example of the vertige effect. If time moved beyond this moment, 
the pair would plummet into the unknown depths beyond the frame 
of the painting. The hung fruits also look to be on the precipice of 
falling. While they may appear to be safe at first, suspended in a way 
which is not gravity defying but instead readily physically explainable, 
this notion falls apart when examining the way the strings are tied 
around the fruits. On the quince, the string is only tied around the 
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quince’s stem. The stem is uniform in thickness throughout—there is 
nothing stopping the stem from sliding completely through the knot. 
On the other hand, it is impossible to tell how the cabbage is secured 
by its string, as all we can see of the string is the knot. It is just as pos-
sible that the string is safely wrapped around the entire cabbage as it 
is that the string is tied around a single leaf. Indeed, it is even possible 
that the string does not secure the cabbage at all, and the cabbage 
would fall uninhibited if time moved forward. Moreover, the conspic-
uous downward arc formed by the fruits gives the whole of the piece a 
feeling of downward motion.
The drama in this piece, then, comes from the fruits on the verge of 
falling. Indeed, everything about the piece’s composition seems to 
point to an impending ‘splat.’ The temptation here may be to read 
this as a vanitas painting that depicts the triumph before the fall 
and the dangers of overabundant riches. However, this painting is 
Juan Sánchez Cotán. Still Life with Quince, Cabbage, Melon and Cucumber, 1602. 
Oil on canvas. San Diego Museum of Art.
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conspicuously lacking in overabundant riches. Indeed, the grey-yel-
low color scheme and imposing black background convey a sense of 
sparseness that, if anything, conflicts with the typical vanitas narra-
tive. A better explanation for the fruits’ impending fall can be found 
by turning back to Caterpillage. When discussing flower still lifes, 
Berger points out that the “posing” of flowers in flower still lifes is 
“imposed,” that “flowers don’t come willingly to their pose” (89). This 
is just as true of fruits. While it may seem perfectly obvious, fruits 
do not have the ability to place themselves on a ledge, or hang them-
selves from a string. This begs the question, how did the fruits assume 
these poses? Indeed, Berger’s assertion that the posing is “imposed” 
necessitates an ‘imposer:’ an unseen entity that actively and intention-
ally placed the fruits to assume these poses. 
The necessity of an imposer then suggests a narrative for how these 
fruits came to be posed, an ‘occasion’ for the painting. While there are 
certainly possible readings in which the imposer is not intentionally 
malevolent, one aspect of the painting negates those readings and 
reveals the true intentions of this imposer: the fact that the fruits are 
in a niche. This means that, even in the world of the painting, the 
fruits are on display, an ornamental, decorative one at that. And the 
fact that this is an intentional display by the imposer means that the 
vertige so heavily present in this painting is also an intentional effect 
by the imposer. The painting is so wholly compositionally geared 
towards implying a tantalizingly close fall that it is impossible that 
the fall is not the deliberate focus of this display. Moreover, the fact 
that this is being displayed in a decorative way implies that one is 
supposed to take pleasure from viewing it. This is reminiscent of the 
“snuff film” voyeurism in Gersht’s piece. However, here the pleasure is 
not taken from the performing of violence, but rather from the threat 
of it. The occasion for this painting, then, becomes a wholly exploit-
ative one. The imposer intentionally placed these fruits on the verge 
of falling and intentionally threatened them with a form of violence 
that would result in their destruction, solely for the purpose of dis-
playing them and taking voyeuristic pleasure from their peril.
While the previous works have only presented fruits as victims of 
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violence, Alejandro de Loarte’s Still Life with Game and Fruit pres-
ents other victims as well—namely, the ‘game.’ At first, the ‘game’ 
may even appear to be the primary victims, as they take up most of 
the space in the painting. The game depicted is not anything out of 
the ordinary for game still lifes: a fish, two hares, and five fowl. Four 
of the foul and two of the hares are hung from the top of the frame. 
One hare in the process of being butchered is turned toward the view-
er, so that the cut in its belly can be seen, the fur surrounding the slit 
tinged red with blood. The piece demonstrates Palmeri’s concept of 
“recognizable animals” being seen alongside the food they are becom-
ing, not only with the butchered belly of the hare, but also with the 
huge rack of meat hung in the center of all the “recognizable forms 
of animals.” In other words, the violence done to the pieces game sub-
jects is readily apparent, easily recognizable. 
And yet, the staging of the subjects pushes against this reading. While 
the hanging animals may initially imply that this food is being stored 
for later consumption, closer inspection proves this is not the case. 
Alejandro de Loarte. Still Life with Game and Fruit, 1623. Oil on canvas.
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All of the game in the painting forms a symmetrical pattern, with the 
basket of quinces and pomegranates on the table serving as the axis of 
symmetry. The animals and meat hung from the ceiling are not only 
symmetrical around the fruit, but also form a triangle that frames the 
fruit basket. Moreover, the bird and fish on the table both lie at an 
angle so that their heads are pointing towards the fruit. All the game 
in the piece is serving to draw the viewer’s eye to the basket of fruit in 
the center of the table. The fruit is the literal center of attention.
Therefore, like in the Cotán, the posing of these animal corpses to 
perfectly frame the fruits suggests that this is a display put together 
by some imposer. After all, just like fruit and flowers, dead animals 
do not have the agency to pose themselves, and certainly not to pose 
themselves in such an artistic way. The question then becomes, “Why 
deliberately frame the fruits in this display?” This question can be 
answered when looking at the violence enacted on the fruits. Like 
the hare, the pomegranates have also been ‘butchered,’ their blood-
red seeds lying exposed. Indeed, the parallel between the rabbit and 
the pomegranates is furthered by the fact that the color palette for 
the pomegranates is nearly identical to that of the rabbit: The pome-
granate seeds match the rabbit’s bloody insides, the white inside of 
the peel matches the white belly, the yellowish brown outside of the 
peel matches the rest of the rabbit’s fur. Moreover, the bodily way in 
which Loarte painted the seeds makes them look like intestines: not 
only do they have the color of innards, but they also have the mushy, 
almost liquid texture. Indeed, some rows of seeds strongly resemble 
the coiling tubes of intestines. By appropriating the visual language 
of violence in game still life, Loarte makes it clear that, in terms of 
the violence done to them, the fruit here is game. But the fruit is not 
just game. The lavish display made by the profusion of dead animals 
makes it clear that this basket of fruits is a trophy. The fruits are the 
‘prize kill’ that the imposer is most proud of. Here, the voyeuristic 
pleasure is not being derived directly from the violence done to the 
fruits, but from the aesthetic beauty of their mutilated bodies. 
One thing that has been lacking from the instances of voyeurism in 
the previously discussed paintings is, ironically, the voyeurs. While 
33
et al.: Full Issue, Special Issue 2, Fall 2018
33
we are shown the displays, there has not yet been a depicted audi-
ence taking pleasure from them. This is different in Blas de Ledesma’s 
Still Life with Cherries and Flowers. First, let us look at the yellow 
flowers. Their bright color makes them stand out against the black 
background. They are placed high above the cherries, and they very 
noticeably lean in over the basket. They look like they are watching 
the cherries, leaning in to get a better view. Why? What is it that they 
are trying to get a better view of?
The answer becomes clear when looking at the cherries. The basket 
is filled to the point of overflowing with cherries. There are cherries 
shown at all stages in this overflow: some cherries are safely confined 
within the basket, others have been shoved out and are lying on the 
table, others still are clinging with their stems to the rim, almost as 
if they are holding on for dear life. A note about these cherries is 
that their hanging on is only accomplished by the fact that they are 
connected to another cherry at the stem. As a result, they are pulling 
another cherry down with them. Indeed, the two pairs of cherries 
lying on the table imply the probable end for these hanging pairs. 
Blas de Ledesma, Still Life with Cherries and Flowers, 1620. Oil on canvas. High 
Museum of Art.
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Violence in this painting, then, looks like cherries being pushed out 
of the basket. Importantly, the painting is showing this instance of 
violence as it is still going on. The viewer does not see the bloody 
aftermath like in the Loarte, but the act itself. The cherries being 
pushed out of the basket is an event that can be watched, like a fight 
in an arena. The basket itself emphasizes this reading, as its wide, 
cylindrical shape strongly resembles that of an ancient Roman arena. 
This resemblance can be seen when comparing the basket with Jerzy 
Strzelecki’s picture of the Colosseum titled Colosseum. Indeed, change 
in the wicker pattern on the basket from the bottom to the top 
mirrors the change in the pattern of the Colosseum’s façade from the 
bottom to the top. If this basket is a colosseum, then that makes the 
cherries the gladiators. Moreover, the arena theme can be seen again 
when looking back to the flowers, as the flowers are arranged in rough 
rows that resemble arena seats. It now becomes clear why the flow-
ers are leaning in: They are the audience to this battle. They are the 
voyeuristic spectators taking pleasure in watching the cherries shove 
each other out of the basket, and they are leaning in so that they can 
get the best view.
And yet, as Berger points out, the cherries do not have the agency to 
shove each other, or at least not to ‘willingly’ shove each other. In-
deed, the ‘shoving’ is due to a lack of space, which the cherries cannot 
control. But this is exactly the point. For the same lack of agency that 
prevents the cherries from committing this violence also prevents 
them from not committing the violence. They are forced by the phys-
ics of their own bodies to take part in this battle. The unwillingness of 
the cherries makes the gladiator narrative of the painting even more 
appropriate. So, in this posing, the cherries are being doubly exploit-
ed. Not only are they made the victims of violence, but they are also 
forced to be the unwilling perpetrators of violence on other cherries. 
Jean-Siméon Chardin’s Basket with Wild Strawberries, obviously 
visually similar to the Ledesma, presents a slight variation on the 
violence seen in Cherries and Flowers. While the damage done to the 
fruit in Cherries and Flowers is caused by fruits forced out of a space, 
the damage done in this painting is caused by fruits forced into one. 
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Jerzy Strzelecki. Colosseum. Wikimedia Commons.
Jean-Siméon Chardin. Basket with Wild Strawberries, 1761. Oil on canvas.
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Chardin depicts a massive heap of strawberries piled into a wicker 
basket. The heap is even more overpowering in this painting, as the 
berries tower high over the top of the basket, whereas only the very 
highest cherries were visible in Cherries and Flowers. However, no 
strawberries are being pushed out of the basket, instead they are being 
pushed further into the space that is too small for them. And the 
effects of this pushing can be clearly seen in the strawberries. There 
are small places on the edge of the basket where strawberries are being 
crushed into the basket and the wicker is beginning to be stained by 
strawberry juice. The strawberries themselves look mushy, like they 
are losing their solid shape, slowly congealing into a jam. This calls 
back to Palmeri’s idea of seeing the “recognizable body” transitioning 
into a food product. Indeed, the liquid blurriness of the strawber-
ries is made apparent by the defined solidness of the peach and the 
cherries. Even the water, an actual liquid, has definite crispness to 
it, further emphasizing the transitional state of the strawberries. So, 
while the cause of harm is slightly different, it would appear then 
that the strawberries are like the cherries in action along with appear-
ance, unwilling perpetrators of violence against themselves. They are 
crushed by their posing, unable to counteract the force of gravity.
And yet, there is another key difference between this painting and 
Cherries and Flowers: the action of the flower. In Cherries and Flowers 
the flowers represented voyeurs, hungrily leaning over the violence 
below them. But here, the flower is turned away from the violence. 
Indeed, it is almost falling off the table, and would fall off if it were 
not tethered to the basket. The flower here looks not only disinter-
ested in the violence, but as if it is actively trying to escape it. If the 
flower cannot be read as a voyeur, then how can it be read?
The flower’s affixation to the strawberries is key here. For this means 
that, in terms of the “occasion” of the painting, the flower was not 
merely placed on the table, it was attached to the strawberries, fixed 
to them so that not even gravity, which is crushing the strawberries, 
could tear it away. Indeed, this is a painting in which Chardin could 
not have simply dangled the flower off the edge of the table, invoking 
the vertige effect, as the role of gravity is defined and made explicit 
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by the fate of the strawberries. This means that the flower is for the 
strawberries. Looking at the flower, with its ghostly white petals and 
green stem, it looks funereal. Indeed, as Berger points out, this flow-
er’s status as being ‘cut’ makes it emblematic of death—death is inher-
ent in its existence. The flower, then, is not meant to mark the plea-
sure taken in this violence, but rather commemorate it solemnly, even 
regretfully. So while this piece is very similar visually to the Ledesma, 
its treatment of its main fruit subjects is completely the opposite. 
It presents an alternative to the voyeurism and exploitation that 
Ledesma’s cherries were subjected to. Indeed, Chardin, like Gersht, is 
picking up on the idea of violence being necessary for the creation of 
fruit still life, but pushing against the idea that this violence must be 
flagrantly exploitative. 
To sum up, each of the paintings so far has treated violence as an 
integral part of fruit still life. The Gersht even portrayed violence as 
necessary for the creation of still life. The Chardin too treated vio-
lence as necessary, though it eschewed the voyeuristic aspects of the 
other works. However, the question that has not been answered is, 
why? Why is violence so necessary to fruit still life?
Louise Moillon. Still Life with Cherries, Strawberries and Gooseberries, 1630. Oil on 
panel. Norton Simon Museum.
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Louise Moillon answers this question in her painting Still Life with 
Cherries, Strawberries and Gooseberries. Evidence of violence is readily 
apparent in the painting. Several of the cherries, mostly towards the 
back edge of their bowl, are marked and bruised. Notably, one of the 
cherries on the front edge has a large hole in it, probably eaten away 
by some insect. The strawberries are also noticeably bruised, with 
one in particular marked by a large, white spot. These are certainly 
subtler markers of violence than in other paintings; however, they 
are still markers. Indeed, one cannot talk about bruised fruit without 
adopting a bodily, violent language. While the particular violence that 
caused these marks is not apparent, this issue will be resolved later. 
Most important for now is that the cherries and strawberries appear 
battered and bruised.
The gooseberries are different, however. They appear to be unmarked, 
unblemished, ideally perfect gooseberries. Indeed, a number of factors 
would make even spotting blemishes on the gooseberries difficult. For 
one, their dark brownish-green color is much more flattering than the 
cherries and strawberries’ bright red. For, as bruises mostly manifest 
in dark brown spots, it would be nearly impossible to distinguish a 
bruise from the dark browns of the gooseberries. Moreover, the goose-
berries are circled by large leaves. These leaves shield the gooseberries 
from the light that readily exposes the bruises on the strawberries and 
cherries. The gooseberries can hide in the dark, while the strawberries 
and cherries cannot.
Moreover, the gooseberries are contained in a wicker basket, while the 
cherries and strawberries are in porcelain bowls. Notably, these porce-
lain bowls themselves depict bowls of fruit. In other words, the straw-
berries and cherries, which are conspicuously not idealized depictions 
of fruits, are contained within idealized depictions of fruits. Not only 
can the strawberries and cherries be compared against the gooseber-
ries, but they can also be compared against their very containers.
In short, everything about this painting makes the strawberries and 
cherries noticeably imperfect when compared with the idealized 
gooseberries. But what is even allowing the comparison between 
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the two groups in the first place? It is their segregation into separate 
bowls. If the fruits were mixed together, unsegregated, it would be 
impossible to get an idea of each group as a whole. However, because 
they are segregated, it is impossible not to view them as a whole, and 
judgments of individuals so easily become judgments of the whole.
Another effect of this segregation is the formation of sides. Note 
that the cherries and strawberries are segregated from each other as 
well; however, it seems natural, even necessary, to link them. For, as 
discussed earlier, they are very similar to each other and wholly the 
opposite of the gooseberries. The formation of sides necessitates the 
comparisons allowed by segregation. Viewers are invited to compare 
the gooseberries with the strawberries and cherries to see which is 
better. In other words, the same differences that allow the strawber-
ries and cherries to be compared negatively with the gooseberries also 
force the strawberries and cherries into a sort of comparison-based 
battle with the gooseberries.
The main violence being depicted here, then, is not physical, but 
representational. Moillon has posed these fruits so that their repre-
sentations are constantly being compared against one another. More-
over, she gives the losers of the representational battle physical scars, 
implying that a blow done in this representational battlefield is as 
damaging to the fruit as an actual blow. In this way, Moillon is saying 
that representation itself is violence, that the creation of still life is 
itself an act of violence. This is Moillon’s answer to the question of 
why violence is necessary in fruit still life. The creation of a still life 
necessitates comparison of the real against the ideal, and this is an act 
of representational violence against the real. 
Again, none of the fruits have the agency to actively take part in this 
battle. But also, this same lack of agency prohibits them from not 
taking part in the battle. They cannot escape their posing just as they 
cannot choose it. The gooseberries are being exploited here just as 
much as the cherries. Though the gooseberries are the representation 
of perfection, it is not through their will or consent that they are pro-
jecting this perfection onto the cherries and strawberries. No matter 
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Aidan Maurstad ‘20 submitted this piece for his ID1 course, The Problem of 
Form: Sonnet, Still Life, Life, with Professor Colleen Rosenfeld, in Fall 2016. It 
was selected as one of the three prize-winning papers.
                                                                                               
Works Cited.
Berger, Harry Jr., Caterpillage. New York, Fordham University Press, 
2011.
Chardin, Jean-Siméon. Basket with Wild Strawberries. 1761, oil on 
canvas.
Cotán, Juan Sánchez. Still Life with Quince, Cabbage, Melon, and 
Cucumber. 1602, oil on canvas, San Diego Museum of Art.
de Ledesma, Blas. Still Life with Cherries and Flowers. 1620, oil on 
canvas, High Museum of Art, Georgia.
de Loarte, Alejandro. Still Life with Game and Fruit. 1623, painting, 
Fundación Santamarca, Madrid.
Gersht, Ori. Pomegranate. 2006, video, The Jewish Museum,  New 
York.
Jordan, William B.. Spanish Still Life In the Golden Age, assistance 
from Sarah Schroth. Fort Worth, Kimbell Art Museum, 1985.
Moillon, Louise. Basket of Plums and Basket of Strawberries. 1632, 
oil on panel, Musee des Augustins de Toulouse, France.
Moillon, Louise. Still Life with Cherries, Strawberries and Gooseberries. 
1630, oil on panel, Norton Simon Museum, California.
Palmeri, Frank. “A Profusion of Dead Animals: Autocritique in 
Seventeenth-Century Flemish Gamepieces.” Journal for Early 
Modern Cultural Studies, vol. 16, no.1, 2016, pp: 50-77. 
Strzelecki, Jerzy. Colosseum. 2007, photograph, Wikimedia 
Foundation. 
what role they play, no matter what narrative is constructed, when 
fruits are posed they are exploited.
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That’s Absurd! (Or is it?)
by Tulika Mohan 
When I heard President-elect Trump say ‘bigly’ (or big league? Pho-
neticians are hard at work unraveling this modern mystery), I was 
immediately reminded by a similar, brutish figure in the 19th century 
mispronouncing ‘Merde’ in a crowded theatre in Paris. Theatre of the 
Absurd led to the creation of some of the most fascinating charac-
ters ever portrayed on stage. I do believe that some of the techniques 
and philosophies of that era still pervade through society today, and 
I hope to keep reworking these ideas to fit situations of our current 
social and cultural realities.
By juxtaposing the Absurdist movement in theater in the 19th centu-
ry with the campaign and subsequent election of billionaire business-
man Donald Trump, we can demonstrate that the ‘absurd’ is dynam-
ic, constantly changing as society evolves.
Editor’s notE: This essay has been adapted to fit on these pages. Pages on 
the left-hand side are to be compared to those on the right-hand side. The 
essay follows.
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‘Merdre!’ screeched Pere Ubu on the opening and closing night of 
Ubu Roi (translated to either King Ubu or King Turd), Alfred Jar-
ry’s most popular play. It featured the greedy and bizarre Pere Ubu 
feeding the Polish army an excrement covered toilet brush and conse-
quently inviting the common people over to his palace for a massive 
orgy (Alfred). 
Unsurprisingly, his play caused a riot in one of the most upscale 
theaters of Paris on December 10, 1896, with many people running 
out of the theater. In fact, this was a typical phenomenon around that 
time. Several similar plays, defined by their nonsensical dialogues, 
cyclical plots, subversion of language and logic, and lack of meaning, 
fascinated and frustrated audience members and critics alike. The type 
of language demonstrated was a far cry from what was usually seen 
in Shakespearean or Elizabethan plays—absurdist plays possessed an 
almost dissonant quality, like they were toying with time. This in-
creased suspense and anticipation for the audience, who were un-
derstandably very annoyed when the climax was something glib and 
meaningless. 
These plays were later grouped together under the term ‘Theater of 
the Absurd,’ which was coined by literary critic Martin Esslin in his 
1960 essay of the same name. Written by primarily European play-
wrights, these plays were shaped in the claustrophobic bubble of 
oppression, following the needlessly devastating destruction of the 
First World War.
For an actor, moving between a traditional acting role to an absurd 
dramatis personae from an absurdist play is no easy feat. In traditional 
theater, the character that the audience sees onstage is not the charac-
ter initially envisioned by the playwright. Rather, it is a new character, 
a hybrid created by combining the essence of the role with the actor’s 
behavior and mannerisms. The actor would attempt to understand 
the background, ambitions and the intent of the character, creating 
a purpose if need be, in order to truly portray the character for the 
audience. In this way, the actor quickly gets lost in the role, and it’s 
43
et al.: Full Issue, Special Issue 2, Fall 2018
43
“You’re fired!” cackled Donald J. Trump to Sam Solovey in the first 
season of The Apprentice, a reality show that propelled him into the 
eyes of the public, and consequently shaped the character of the Pres-
ident-elect. It was a stroke of good fortune for both Trump and Mark 
Burnett, the creator of Survivor, to have met each other. 
When they met to discuss the potential structure of the show, Burnett 
explained that the show would showcase the Trump empire better 
than any advertisement or business deal would—viewers would see 
his casinos, his hotels, his golf courses, and his apartment. They 
would finally have a chance to understand the life of the ostentatious 
business mogul. Of course, the show also required Trump to be the 
judge, jury and executioner of the contestants, who were all eager for 
a chance to work in leadership positions in Trump’s profitable busi-
nesses.  Trump was initially hesitant about signing on to a television 
show. For a long time, Trump had been derisive of reality television, 
claiming it was for bottom-feeders of society (Kranish). 
Though he was concerned about the time commitment the show rep-
resented, he also knew it would be a powerful means of showcasing 
his brand. Finally, Burnett convinced him to sign on by telling Trump 
that by starring in (and producing) his own TV, Trump would no 
longer be a product of journalists’ headlines and edited interviews. He 
would be in control of his own narrative.
For the entirety of his run on the show The Apprentice, Trump refused 
to memorize any lines. He would read the basic outline of the episode 
in advance and improvise it during the actual shooting of the show. 
His catchphrase “You’re fired!” was in fact ad-libbed, its iconic status 
cemented when the production crew cheered immediately afterwards. 
As the show continued on for 14 seasons, Trump began to develop his 
signature style of speaking. The opening montage featured a subver-
sive image of Trump in his limo with a homeless man on a bench 
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difficult to discern whether it is the actor or the character that bids 
the audience adieu at the end of a performance. In contrast, there is 
no ‘meaning-making’ process in theater of the absurd. Characters of 
absurdist plays don’t bother concealing their motivations, which are 
usually governed by a single thought without any regard for the con-
sequences. How does the actor justify her character’s actions to herself 
(and, in turn, to the audience) if the character is irrational, impulsive, 
and not grounded in reality? 
The only solution is for the actor to isolate and then remove the ‘ide-
al’ self that she has built up over the years, based on interactions with 
and social cues from the myriad individuals and elements in their en-
vironment. She then transforms into the ‘black sheep’ of society, who 
is not only capable but actually willing to act on deviant thoughts. By 
indulging her deepest, most outrageous instincts, she is free from the 
burden of societal expectations, of acting ‘normal’. 
In this way, she becomes an amalgamation of her most authentic 
thoughts, perhaps even revealing her truest self to the audience. 
The character of Ubu Roi, for instance, was a caricature of the baser 
human instincts. He makes himself King of Poland and proceeds to 
kill everyone without batting an eye, all while the overall ambience 
of the production comes across as eerily childlike. Jarry expressed our 
unfiltered psychological states by objectifying them onstage (Ahmed). 
Understandably, the theater of the absurd was initially met with 
incomprehension and rejection by audiences and critics alike. In fact, 
after watching Samuel Beckett’s Waiting for Godot, one critic summed 
up his experience by quoting one of the lines from the play, “Noth-
ing happens, nobody comes, nobody goes, it’s awful” (Bennett). At 
first, people flocked to see Waiting for Godot and The Bald Soprano by 
Eugene Ionesco simply because it was fashionable to express outrage 
about them at parties. Soon, however, they became eager to dissect 
each scene of the play, to understand the purpose behind creating a 
plotless production with grotesque characters and awkward, arrhyth-
mic dialogue.
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outside. It was essentially a gigantic promotion for his brand. On 
the pilot episode, he boasted, “I’m the largest real estate developer in 
New York. I’ve mastered the art of the deal and have turned the name 
Trump into the highest-quality brand. And as the master, I want to 
pass along some of my knowledge to somebody else.” He used brief, 
declarative sentences, pulled off both playful and vicious taunts to the 
finalists with equal aplomb, and fascinated the audience with his dra-
matic sense of timing. “I’ve never had lessons,” he said proudly, “I’ve 
always felt comfortable in front of the camera. Either you’re good at it 
or you’re not good at it” (Kranish). 
The success of his TV show renewed questions about which aspects 
of Trump’s public persona reflected his true self and which were pure 
showmanship, aspects he perfected to draw in the public. Trump 
sometimes scoffed at the idea that he’d created a separate or different 
character that he played on the public stage, sometimes insisting that 
the things he said on TV were intended simply to provoke or enter-
tain.
The show was a runaway success.  It was the seventh most watched 
show of 2004, averaging about 21 million viewers every week. The 
Apprentice transformed Trump from a typical Richie Rich to a straight 
talking, Simon Cowell-esque politically incorrect truth teller, a per-
sona that he carried into his candidacy for the highest public office in 
the country. Trump always had politics at the back of his mind—he 
considered running for presidency in 1988 and 2012 as a Republican, 
and actually ran a presidential campaign in 2000 for the nomination 
of the Reform Party. 
When he at last secured the nomination of the Republican Party in 
July 2016, still performing and perfecting the persona he had played 
on The Apprentice, the media was left wondering what reasons were 
behind his long-running interest in politics.
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Thus began the formulation of possible theories for what the absurdist 
playwright wanted to convey to the audience. Critics compared the 
techniques used in absurdist plays with other theatrical productions 
from different time periods and then focused on the similarities 
between the absurdist plays that were staged in the late 1950s and 
modernist plays that were staged around the end of the 19th centu-
ry. The literary and artistic movement of Modernism became more 
prominent after the First World War, as more and more authors and 
artists began doubting and reassessing the foundations of civil society. 
For instance, Henrik Ibsen’s Hedda Gabla and The Wild Duck were 
performed as though an audience were not watching. In fact, actors 
went through rigorous training to ensure that they wouldn’t acknowl-
edge or even make eye contact with the audience present in order 
to preserve this carefully constructed illusion of realism (Harrison). 
Critics also found it useful to focus on the works and techniques of 
Bertolt Brecht, who may be the most obvious influence on the theater 
of the absurd. Brecht outlined the principle of Verfremdungseffekt, or 
the estrangement effect, which involved “stripping the event of its 
self-evident, familiar, obvious quality and creating a sense of aston-
ishment and curiosity about them” (Thomson). His techniques often 
involved harsh, bright stage lighting, or the pronouncement of stage 
directions. Brecht paved the way for absurdist theater, which aims to 
provoke the deepest level of the audience’s awareness—to push them, 
frighten them, make them consciously assess their reactions to the 
happenings onstage. 
Martin Esslin’s use of the word ‘absurd’ alludes to Albert Camus’ 
1942 essay “Myth of Sisyphus,” in which he argues that Sisyphus, 
condemned to push a boulder up a hill for all eternity, can be under-
stood as happy. He knows that his task is absolutely meaningless and 
embraces that realization. He no longer has any illusions about his 
purpose in the world (Camus). Jean-Paul Sartre famously observed 
that “we are nothing and in action become conscious of that original 
nothingness.”
Absurd strategies were therefore a method to cope with and come 
to terms with a universe devoid of meaning and logic. Martin Esslin 
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The mainstream media, for most part, implied that the suggestion 
that Donald Trump could become the 45th President of the United 
States was simply absurd. As the campaign continued and Trump 
seemed to become a viable candidate in the eyes of many, the media 
changed their outlook. Trump had been a spectator in the political 
arena for decades but made his way to the fore by becoming a major 
donor to the Republican Party. However, believing his candidacy 
to merely be a publicity stunt to revive a dying reality TV show, the 
media refused to take him seriously. However, the country did not—
he gained ground in several states that should have been sure wins for 
Hillary Clinton, the Democratic Party candidate and one of the most 
qualified individuals in US history to run for office. David Keene, the 
former chairman of the American Conservative Union, admitted, “It’s 
almost comical, except it’s liable to end up with him as the nominee” 
(Haberman). The press dismissed Trump’s initial lead as temporary, 
believing his success was largely due to his celebrity status. However, 
Trump’s unprecedented win led to the media’s hasty analysis of his 
past motivations and reasons, in an attempt to understand how and 
why he had resonated with so many people at a national level. They 
‘discovered’ that politics had been Trump’s end game all along. Some 
believed that the ambition of becoming president was ‘birthed’ at the 
2011 White House Correspondents’ Association Dinner, where Pres-
ident Obama ridiculed his show The Apprentice, and Trump’s belief 
in the conspiracy that President Obama was not born in the United 
States (Schulman). 
By linking incidents, events and conversations, the media wove a 
narrative that explained their failure of anticipating Trumps’ historic 
win. They dug up statements he had made years before, speculated 
over Trump’s ‘casual’ dinners with political advisors and polling agents 
such as Kellyanne Conway, and his famous endorsement of the 2012 
Republican nominee, Mitt Romney, at a Trump property in Florida. 
The media’s control of the narrative extended in both directions, with 
famous talk show hosts like John Oliver and Samantha Bee as well as 
the cast of Saturday Night Live trivializing the possibility of his victo-
ry even weeks before the election results were revealed. They reached 
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attempts to explain the motives behind absurdist plays, nothing that 
“the Theatre of the Absurd strives to express its sense of the sense-
lessness of the human condition and the inadequacy of the rational 
approach by the open abandonment of rational devices and discursive 
thought. While Sartre and Camus express the new content in the old 
convention, the theater of the absurd goes a step further in trying to 
achieve a unity between its basic assumptions and the form in which 
these are expressed” (Esslin).
It should be noted that it took theater critics over 60 years to artic-
ulate why these plays stood in such stark difference to traditional 
theatrical productions. Researchers and critics continue to probe the 
matter, to see if they can predict when the next unorthodox theater 
style comes to the fore, what shape it will take, and what norms it will 
disrupt. 
Critics echoed the words of the playwright Joe Orton from his play 
What the Butler Saw (1969): “You can’t be rational in an irrational 
world, it’s not rational.” By tracing the roots of theater and finding 
traces of established techniques in absurdist plays, critics gradually 
came to accept the theater of the absurd as a well-researched and pre-
cise art form that they had anticipated all along.
Today, people rush to see re-stagings of famous absurdist plays in 
their local theaters. These productions are enjoyed, not reviled, and 
techniques that were considered abhorrent are now emulated. The use 
of crass language, lack of plot, and clown-like characters is now con-
sidered to be high-brow, purposeful sophisticated art. What was first 
considered ‘absurd’ was gradually accepted as convention, no longer 
breaking the wall as it did before. The absurd is not solely a political 
and cultural movement from the 1960s. Rather, it is the continuous 
subversion and embracement of what mainstream society considers 
normal and expected.
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heights of political parody never before summited, continuing to 
ridicule Trump after his narrow victory. 
To this date, people remain in disbelief about the election results. 
Campaigns on Change.org to restructure the executive branch of the 
government and dismantle the electoral college have attained consid-
erable Internet traction. At the same time, reporters continue to tug 
at the seams of political history, attempting to find a similarly disrep-
utable figure from the past that had won against all odds. Others hast-
ily begin writing biographies of the President-elect, guaranteed to fly 
off shelves. The questions that political pundits and elites must answer 
seem insurmountable—was this election just an aberration in the 
well-researched and measured voting behaviors of Americans, or does 
it set a new precedent for how campaign strategies will work in swing 
states? Was becoming president a long-time ambition of Trump’s, as 
the media suggested, or was it a series of random actions made by the 
businessman that somehow resonated with the public?
While a large section of America mourned for their nation, many 
rejoiced. For them, this unabashedly blunt, anti-establishment busi-
nessman with the goal of building a wall between US and Mexico 
and creating a Muslim registry was a long time coming. They believed 
America was finally returning to her roots, correcting the prolonged 
deviance that the last few decades represented. The country would 
return to the ideal political and economic system that had been envi-
sioned by the Founding Fathers. This fraction of the American voters 
looked past Trump’s derogatory remarks about minorities, women, 
and the differently abled, remarks which had come under serious 
scrutiny a few years prior. Eight years ago, the mere idea of a biracial 
president of the United States might have been absurd. History, with 
all its triumphs, failures, twists, and ironies, tells us everything and 
nothing at once. It reveals several possibilities, both plausible and im-
plausible. Which of these is more likely to occur—if at all? The future 
is unknown but imaginable, and humanity will continue its obsessive 
fascination with predicting it.
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Thus we observe that absurdism is a fluid concept. Since time makes 
permeable the boundaries between the absurd and the normal, we can 
hypothesize that everything that exists within the realm of possibility 
is absurd. Alternately, and more optimistically, we can state that noth-
ing is absurd and anything is possible.
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The Government, in Love.
by Chunghwa Suh 
I have been thinking about love. Usually, when I think about love, 
I think about specific people in my life. Potential love, lost love, the 
forgotten, the unrequited, the I-don’t-know-why-but-I-can’t-stop-
thinking-about, and everything in between. These spaces create my 
personal discourse: it is informed by the boundaries I set within the 
sphere of my relationships, how I identify sexually, and the other rules 
or guidelines I use to think about love. For example, even though I 
don’t know Joe very well, I think a lot about Joe.1 And the way that I 
think about Joe is organized around a myriad of elements that come 
together to create a fantasy Joe; the person I think about is completely 
different from the person who exists outside my head. We don’t have 
a lot in common. He’s three years older, he grew up in the States, he 
plays sports, and he carries himself with the casual, confident man-
ner of a handsome white male with above-average intelligence. I am 
at once unable to relate to Joe and completely drawn to him. I will 
spend hours thinking about him, poring over details on social media 
and trying to absorb some of his enigmatic essence of ease. I try to 
define specific aspects of his personality that manifest in his public 
persona. What do his hashtags say about him? How does he caption 
his Instagram photos? Why does he always make that face in his 
Snapchats?
And all the while, I have been thinking about love. I chose to write 
three essays about monogamy because relationships have always fasci-
nated me. For the past month, I have been researching, writing about, 
analyzing, and critiquing the way our society deals with love on a 
large scale. This research has impacted my personal discourse. The 
more I learn about sexuality—the different motivations behind how 
we define it, the oppressive power structures that change its meaning, 
and the many ways it is prone to change—the more I question my 
discourse. 
1 Names have been anonymized.
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What, exactly, is my infatuation with Joe founded upon? In what 
ways do I think about him? Why do I continue to think about him, 
even as I am very aware that he’s just not that into me? To Joe, I am 
just a moment: fleeting in the days we see each other, nonexistent in 
the days we don’t. But to me, Joe is a haze, drifting through my mind 
constantly.2
The bias in my first essay, in which I posed the question of whether 
or not monogamy “works,” came through as a result of my obsession. 
The topic was a way of pushing back the part of me that was defining 
myself through Joe; I was seeking the opportunity to reinvent myself, 
in a sense, through the essay. I had already decided that monogamy 
was a flawed social construct; I chose to define myself through my 
rejection of normative monogamy, and thus the influence of society 
on my sexuality. Monogamy was an evil social structure imposing its 
boundaries on me. But I now realize I am the naïve public that wants 
to believe the “repressive hypothesis” that Foucault criticizes in his 
History of Sexuality. Foucault argues that the public is more inclined 
to believe in the repressive hypothesis in order to see our sexuality as 
something powerful, something revolutionary. The repressive hypoth-
esis attaches an aspect of political liberation to sexual discourse. It 
encourages the idea that openly talking about or engaging in “illicit 
sexual behavior,” or “perversions,” is a way of protest. 
But Foucault tells us that, in fact, our very conception of sexuality is 
founded upon society; sexuality cannot exist without its human, so-
cial history. And this history is shaped by the very political structures 
we convince ourselves we are fighting against. Hence, the idea that we 
are using sexuality to fight against repressive power structures is null. 
We cannot see sexual discourse solely through the lens of the repres-
sive hypothesis; we cannot seek to escape power structures through 
sexuality, because our understanding of sexuality is a manifestation of 
those structures. My rejection of monogamy—and my self-righteous 
belief that this rejection somehow set me apart—does not mean what 
I want it to mean.3 
2 Commonly known as “a pathetic crush.”
3 I ask myself, will I ever find the magical element to my personality that can make 
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So what is monogamy, and how does it work? Why is it that, even as 
I thumb through the foundational text of polyamory, Dossie Eaton 
and Catherine A. Liszt’s The Ethical Slut, I secretly panic at the idea of 
Joe being with anyone else? Normative monogamy has enforcers all 
throughout our society, at all levels: the church, conservatives, hope-
less romantics, Jennifer Aniston; even young people who try to reject 
everything “mainstream” recognize monogamy’s importance.4 It is one 
of the few social institutions so firmly embedded in our culture that it 
is practically part of our subconscious. 
In her article “Against Love,” Laura Kipnis traces the inextricable ties 
between love and monogamy: in society’s eyes, to reject monogamy 
is to reject love. Monogamy’s allure can be equated to that of love. 
Who doesn’t romanticize the idea that someone out there is made for 
them, that they will find one person with whom they find a connec-
tion above and beyond anything else in the world?5 If we refer back 
to my original question regarding whether monogamy “works,” this 
mentality provides an answer: yes, monogamy works and will always 
work as long as we hold out the human desire to be special. Today, 
our aggressively capitalist society enhances this mentality. We strive 
to be the best.  We compete. We protect our assets. We are raised in 
a way that enforces this behavior; it only makes sense that we would 
treat our relationships the same way. 
I therefore began to trace back my own beliefs and let myself be 
swept into the romantic allure of monogamy. Admittedly, I do see 
something beautiful about being someone’s “everything.”6 It may be 
me “cool”?
4 When I asked my 15-person ID1 class whether they wanted to get married some-
day, 13 people raised their hands; it was interesting to see how normative monoga-
my is still alive and well amidst a generation growing up with a 50% divorce rate. 
5 Emphasis on the word “find”—part of the romanticized notion of love is very 
involved in the search. Every romantic comedy relies on this narrative arc; it makes 
the payoff (the discovery!) all the more satisfying.
6 However, admitting this feels like a kind of submission to the brainwashing that 
society enforces upon us. The feeling parallels to agreeing with society’s beauty 
standards (I fawn over the most stereotypically “pretty,” emaciated, blonde, leggy 
models); it means that I am agreeing with the racism and sexism inherent in those 
standards. Perhaps the romanticizing of normative monogamy is not as clearly 
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a source of pride, being able to fulfill someone’s every desire. It is this 
quality that Esther Perel, a psychotherapist who specializes in rela-
tionships, addresses in her TED Talk about infidelity: cheating hurts 
differently today, because our expectations of love (and consequently, 
ourselves) are so vast. When we engage in a monogamous relation-
ship—really, truly let ourselves believe in the concept and the bond—
we choose to believe that we are a little bit perfect. As Perel puts it: I 
am this person’s best friend, greatest lover, intellectual equal, I am this 
person’s very favorite person. This status is a huge ego boost. 
For the emotionally vulnerable, the desperate for any kind of nod of 
approval,7 monogamy offers an opportunity to find ourselves. In a 
way, it is the ultimate validation. This is perhaps why marriage is seen 
as life’s “happily ever after”: it marks not only the ending point of the 
search for love, it also marks the ending point of the search for our-
selves.8 There is, however, a risk: “infidelity has a tenacity that monog-
amy can only envy.” In the sphere of monogamy, if another person 
enters the picture, it’s not just the relationship that shatters. Our very 
sense of being—and all the validation built upon the relationship—is 
destroyed.9
Thus, the people who reject monogamy are often painted as emo-
tionally unavailable, scared of love, unable to take a risk, overly 
defensive—damaged. In some cases, this depiction might be valid. If 
I tell myself that I don’t need to be someone’s one-and-only, I will not 
be privy to the pain and heartbreak of infidelity. However, I loathe 
the notion that self-preservation is the only reason people choose 
entrenched in the evils of society, but it runs along a similar vein.
7 See: “depressingly universal qualities of teenage girls.”
8 In the TV series “Bojack Horseman,” one of the characters talks about our “age of 
stagnation.” She argues that everyone reaches this point at which they stop growing, 
and that for most people, it happens when they get married: “You meet someone 
who loves you unconditionally and never challenges you or wants you to change…
and then you never change.” While certainly not true for all marriages, I believe 
that there is validity in the notion that we find some finality in our sense of self 
once we make the decision to stay committed to someone forever. 
9 Perhaps this is the ultimate “heartbreak.” The very pain that infidelity brings is en-
capsulated in the term: it “breaks” what is most intrinsic to us, that which symboliz-
es our livelihood, our capacity to love (not just others, but ourselves, as well). 
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non-monogamy. It diminishes the non-monogamous lifestyle and 
paints it as a lesser alternative, one that is chosen only by those who 
are “too messed up to be normal.” This marginalization is what Judith 
Butler writes about in “Competing Universalities”: with every defi-
nition comes the outlying group, and with every argument that the 
definition is “universal”—that monogamy is love—the outliers are 
further abstracted and alienated. 
We must therefore call into question our very need for definitions. If 
categorization will always lend to marginalization, how do we un-cat-
egorize? When I began to look at monogamy as an issue, I simply saw 
it as a shallow duality. The debate in my head was between monoga-
my and polyamory, and which was “better.” But this binary thinking 
is the problem: as Butler articulates, “the very categories that are polit-
ically available for identification restrict in advance the play of hege-
mony, dissonance and rearticulation” (“Competing Universalities” 
150). By only looking at an issue from two opposing sides, we are 
accepting the current categorizations in play; we restrict any change 
and possibility for growth.
Butler uses the discussion around sexuality as a method of further 
understanding how we can protect the marginalized and change what 
she calls “the horizon of hegemony.” Based on perspective, the hori-
zon line changes: social norms rely on positionality—we are able to 
repurpose and redefine them. It is not enough, however, to simply 
subvert norms. Changing our definitions of social structures only 
continues to marginalize and dehumanize others. We must reject the 
boundaries of definition and categorization—blurring the very lines 
that confine us in the first place. We can look at the development 
of our society’s understanding of sexual orientation as an example: 
establishing categories of “homosexual” and “bisexual” as “socially ac-
ceptable” within our discourse does not protect these identities. Such 
distinct categorization continues to encourage our need for compari-
son, to establish one identity as “better” or more “normal.” However, 
when we look at sexuality as a spectrum and not a choice between 
different entities, these comparisons are not so easily drawn. 
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Language needs to allow resistance to language. Butler argues that our 
very sense of self is founded upon the paradoxical nature of norms 
that are “done” to us, and our attempts to live around them. But if 
these norms make life is unlivable (the way that a binary understand-
ing of gender does to many), we must question them, pry them apart, 
and understand how we can change them to allow for inclusivity. 
It is important to note that Butler does not regard all social norms 
as negative. She acknowledges that certain norms afford a degree 
of stability that is required to engage in a livable life. The issue of 
norms becomes problematic, however, when the state and legislation 
become involved: “what is most important is to cease legislating for 
all lives what is livable only for some, and similarly, to refrain from 
proscribing for all lives what is unlivable for some” (Undoing Gender 
8). My question thus transformed from whether monogamy “works” 
to whether the state should be involved in its enforcement. How 
effectively monogamy functions within our society or within specific 
relationships is But when we see how monogamous marriage is tied 
with legislation, and how marriage is the only legally recognized form 
of romantic kinship, it becomes a problem. 
Of course, there is the argument that marriage and monogamy are 
not actively enforced by the government. Polyamorous culture is alive 
and well among today’s youth.10 However, with state recognition, 
marriage becomes the exclusive way of establishing romantic kinship 
within our society. The spousal rights, paternal rights, details regard-
ed in wills, taxes, insurance, and everything else makes marriage a 
requirement. And if love and kinship are factors of a ‘livable’ life—
which was the very argument used to advocate for gay marriage—
then its normative status makes life unlivable for all those who oppose 
it. Butler writes that
10 Although, it is important to note that most polyamorous relationships are still 
founded on a loose basis of monogamy; in Emily Witt’s memoir Future Sex, the 
triad of Elizabeth, Wes, and Chris is more of a duo with an addendum. Chris and 
Emily get their “happily ever after” and end up married. They still keep their other 
lovers in rotation and are open both emotionally and sexually to people outside 
their marriage, but there is a clear bond between the pair that exists nowhere else. 
Hence, they at once reject and yet still adhere to normative monogamy.
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efforts to establish bonds of kinship that are not based on a marriage tie be-
come nearly illegible and unviable when marriage sets the terms for kinship, 
and kinship itself is collapsed into “family.” The enduring social ties that 
constitute viable kinship in communities of sexual minorities are threatened 
with becoming unrecognizable and unviable as long as the marriage bond is 
the exclusive way in which both sexuality and kinship are organized. (Undo-
ing Gender 5)
The state is essential in defining our society’s terms of love and family. 
Monogamy is a social construct. It does not work for everyone, and 
it is not the ideal standard of love that we have made it out to be. For 
some, it is more restrictive than productive. The state’s endorsement 
of it is part of the “unwanted legislation of identity” that is being 
dismantled with issues of sexual orientation and gender.11
But if not marriage, then what? Perhaps we should leave that decision 
to private citizens. I am aware that dismantling the institution of mar-
riage could have unforeseen societal impacts. It is embedded in our 
culture, and a litany of laws would have to be amended or repealed. 
But what I like to imagine is a version of myself, in the distant future 
or in a parallel universe, where non-monogamy is not ‘non-monoga-
my,’ where relationships are not defined according to gender, number, 
or any other divisive factors. I like to imagine a future me, uninhibit-
ed by social norms, free of the state’s influence preaching the exclusive 
priority of monogamy above all else. 
This is the “remaking of the self ” that Butler talks about in Undoing 
Gender. In the future, she writes, “the self must be dispossessed in 
sociality in order to take possession of itself ” (Undoing Gender 7). I 
hope to be able to love without the fear of being replaced, without the 
notion that someone’s affection for me is undermined by their affec-
tion for others. 
I run away from myself by believing certain institutions, or the eradi-
cation of them, will elicit some kind of change in my being—my inse-
curities, unhappiness, and everything else. So I still have some kind of 
11 Cases like Lawrence v. Texas, which struck Texas’s anti-sodomy law, acknowledged 
that the state had no business governing the private sex lives of its’ citizens; likewise, 
we must ask, why does it have the right to govern the way we love?
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essential belief in the repressive theory. I try to see a light at the end of 
the tunnel, what I imagine as “sexual liberation.” While some spend 
their lives pursuing the promise of eternal peace awaiting them at the 
end of their lives, I pursue an impossible freedom from the influence 
of society. Perhaps my understanding of Foucault—and, concurrently, 
my understanding of freedom—needs to be further developed. But 
this is my discourse. It is still being defined. 
We have gained much from steadfast, relentless categorization, identi-
fication, and a stream of discourse that seeks to flesh out each “perver-
sion,” each category of sexuality: we are informed. We are cognizant 
of deep aspects of what makes up our desires. But in this steadfast 
analysis and governance of human sexuality, the hegemonic horizon 
remains fixed: our laws and definitions protect few, and make life 
unlivable for many. Change requires a different approach. We must 
try to reach inclusion and universality through different methods, the 
return to anonymity. Detachment is the next step in our state’s rela-
tionship with our relationships. The government distanced itself from 
sex (relatively speaking), now it needs to do the same with love.
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A Moderate Approach to 
Extreme Altruism.
by Brendan Terry 
In “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Peter Singer advances a 
“Strong Principle” of moral action that has prodigious implications: 
“If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, 
without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral impor-
tance, we ought, morally, to do it” (231). Singer’s Strong Principle 
is a hotly contested, influential topic in Utilitarian ethics.1 As Singer 
himself recognizes, “If [the Strong Principle] were acted upon, even 
in its qualified form, our lives, our society, and our world would be 
fundamentally changed” (231). 
The Strong Principle requires moral agents to be extremely altruistic. 
It is Singer’s theoretical keystone to the most radical practical realiza-
tion of his argument: affluent people (by global standards) have the 
duty to donate money to charities that effectively assist the world’s 
poor until they themselves are nearly as poor as the people whom 
they send money to help. The Strong Principle makes three main 
claims in support of such a duty. It explicitly stipulates that one’s ca-
pacity to help is proportionate to one’s moral responsibility to help, and 
it implicitly suggests that one’s duty to help others is not lessened by 
physical distance or whether one is among millions capable of provid-
ing assistance (231). 
Though I agree with these conclusions, I consider the Strong Princi-
ple to be based upon a deceptive predicating assumption, introduced 
at the start of Singer’s essay: that “suffering and death from lack of 
food, shelter, and medical care are bad” (231). In a previous paper, I 
demonstrated that this predicating assumption embeds in its charac-
terization of “bad” the moral imperative that Singer presents in the 
Strong Principle (from which he derives all of his conclusions). Thus, 
Singer assumes his own conclusions, or begs the question. This opens 
1 The essay has over two thousand citations to date.
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his argument to technical objections that undermine the philosophi-
cal grounds of his call to action. However, I contend that the Strong 
Principle is worthy of alternative supporting arguments because it 
radically conceives of extreme altruism as a moral obligation (Brock).2
To consider altruism in a moral sense, I must clarify what I judge to 
be moral concerns, or what I mean by “morality.” I agree with Ber-
nard and Joshua Gert, who argue that morality is an “informal public 
system that all rational persons, under certain specified conditions, 
would endorse.” An informal public system is a normative system that 
is knowable by and rational to follow for all to whom it applies; it 
also, roughly stated, does not involve an authority that definitively 
decides how it functions. While it is beyond the scope of this paper 
to give a detailed description of under which specified conditions 
rational agents must operate to agree upon a morality, a significant 
condition worth noting here is that all agents must be sufficiently 
informed (Gert).
I also consider the Strong Principle to be a moral rule, since it pro-
vides clear guidelines to evaluate our actions in relation to harms, 
and I am persuaded by Gert’s observation that “moral rules do seem 
to limit their content to behavior that directly or indirectly causes 
or risks harm to others.” The Strong Principle has a societal aim—to 
mitigate severe suffering—so it also conforms with the claim that 
“having a certain sort of social goal is definitional of morality” (Fran-
kena).
From the perspective of morality as an informal public system and 
the Strong Principle as a moral rule whose goal is to mitigate severe 
suffering, we can begin to analyze the Principle’s merits in a shared 
context. Consider it again: “if it is in our power to prevent something 
bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of compa-
rable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.” One could ob-
ject that the Strong Principle supposes allowing harm is very morally 
wrong, but one reasonably could believe only doing harm is very mor-
ally wrong (Woollard). Under this interpretation, the Strong Princi-
2  This is Gillian Brock’s characterization of the Strong Principle.
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ple’s position is generally cast as consequentialist—Singer is himself 
a consequentialist. As Fiona Woollard and Frances Howard-Snyder 
write, “consequentialists believe that doing harm is no worse than 
merely allowing harm while anti-consequentialists, almost universally, 
disagree.” 
However, I would argue that the Strong Principle does not explicit-
ly indicate that doing harm is equal to allowing harm. In “Famine, 
Affluence, and Morality,” Singer only suggests that allowing harm, in 
extreme circumstances, can be very morally wrong. Someone who ac-
cepts that allowing harm is even slightly morally wrong would likely 
accept that allowing extreme harm could be very morally wrong; for 
example, such a person, consequentialist or not, may believe that let-
ting someone die is generally very wrong. Indeed, because the severe 
suffering that Singer examines is tantamount to death, and since that 
suffering is quite practically preventable (through donation to cer-
tain charities, for instance), the aspect of the Strong Principle which 
claims that “allowing harm is morally wrong” seems tenable (“What 
Makes a Charity Effective?”).
Another objection to Singer’s Strong Principle is that it proposes too 
extreme a form of “obligatory beneficence” (Beauchamp).3 In “Fam-
ine, Affluence, and Morality,” Singer predicts such an objection, so he 
proposes an additional weak principle: “If it is in our power to pre-
vent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing 
anything morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it,” (emphasis 
added) which adheres to:
the more or less classic idea...that a person P has an obligation of benefi-
cence to help another whenever the other is at risk of significant loss of or 
damage to some basic interest; P’s action is necessary (singly or collabora-
tively) to prevent this loss or damage; P’s action (singly or collaboratively) 
is likely to prevent the loss or damage; and P’s action does not present 
significant risks, costs, or burdens to P while the benefits that the other 
3 As Tom Beauchamp writes, “the language of a principle or rule of beneficence refers 
to a normative statement of a moral obligation to act for the others' benefit, helping 
them to further their important and legitimate interests, often by preventing or 
removing possible harms.”
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person can be expected to gain outweigh any burden that P is likely to incur 
(Beauchamp).
Of course, Singer’s Strong Principle opposes this traditional view 
since it suggests that one has a moral obligation to help alleviate 
suffering until one reaches “marginal utility, the point at which, by 
giving more, one would cause oneself and one’s dependents as much 
suffering as one would prevent in [others]” (Singer 234). So the 
Strong Principle suggests a moral obligation to give even when there 
are significant “risks, costs, or burdens to P.” Only once one reaches 
marginal utility, where one’s capacity to assist becomes negligible, 
does one no longer have the moral responsibility to assist. Thus, the 
acceptance of marginal utility as a practical limit to one’s obligation 
to help appears to be the theoretical keystone of the Strong Principle. 
I will reduce this to the question of altruism vis-à-vis egoism: if I am 
affluent and have a high standard of living, what could morally oblige 
me to be as highly altruistic as Singer proposes? 
If I were highly altruistic, I would not be significantly influenced by 
how helping others could benefit me. I would choose to help peo-
ple based on how much they needed help rather than how much I 
desired to help them—I would help impartially. Indeed, self-interest 
would be an insignificant consideration in establishing the morality 
of my actions (Kraut). This could perhaps lead me to break social 
expectations of decency. For example, if I were highly altruistic (and 
informed), I probably would not choose to buy gifts for my other 
affluent friends—which would lose me social capital and be difficult 
emotionally—because that money could be used to help people who 
severely suffer.4 
More absurdly, if I were to come across a hungry homeless person in 
the street, I might choose not to give him a couple dollars’ worth of 
4 As a sidenote, a common empirically-dependent response to extreme altruism is 
that the suffering can and ought to help themselves. Though some use this claim to 
argue against altruism altogether, most use it to argue against a moral obligation to 
be extremely altruistic. However, in a recent literature review entitled “What Makes 
Charity Effective?” I presented convincing evidence that people who severely suffer 
cannot be expected help themselves to escape from such suffering. 
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food, which would make me feel callous and have other consequenc-
es, because I would know that my money, with the appropriate elec-
tronic fund transfer, could help a person almost dead from starvation 
half a world away. 
In one classic defense of impartiality in moral decision-making, Ben-
tham, Mill, Kant, and Sidgwick argue that “when we think morally 
about what to do, reason takes a god’s-eye perspective and sets aside 
the emotional bias we normally have in our own favor, or in favor of 
our circle of friends or our community” (Kraut). 
While this view could defend the Strong Principle, I do not find it 
especially compelling because while it captures why one ought to help 
others, it does not directly respond to my question: “Why should I, 
given my natural self-interest, help others?” Kraut expounds: “It is as 
though we forget about locating ourselves as this particular person; 
we abstract away from our normal self-centered perspective and seek 
the solution to a practical problem that anyone similarly impartial 
would also arrive at.” How could anyone reasonably be expected to 
act morally, if this were the case?
In another classic defense of impartiality, Hume, Schopenhauer, and 
Smith argue:
It holds that there is something extraordinarily valuable in the sentimental 
bonds that take hold among human beings—a feature of human life that is 
overlooked or distorted when morality is understood solely or primarily in 
impersonal terms and from a god’s-eye point of view. In favorable condi-
tions, we naturally and emotionally respond to the weal and woe of others; 
we do not and should not look for reasons to do so (Kraut).
This stance, however, condones the ignoring of reason by moral 
agents. Therefore, importantly, it does not fit Gert’s definition of 
morality as a normative system that is both knowable by and rational 
to follow for all to whom it applies. 
I offer a position somewhat between the two presented above, and my 
conclusions promote the same morality as the Strong Principle: “if it 
is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without 
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thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we 
ought, morally, to do it.” My argument is in short that individuals 
must reason from their innate emotions to a morality that encourages 
essentially pure altruism (D’Agostino).5 I postulate that we as human 
beings are fundamentally distinct persons, not simply part of a larger 
social organism that has a duty of self-preservation.6 I also posit that 
morally right actions do good for an entity that holds significant 
intrinsic value (e.g. a person). These predicating assumptions serve 
to clarify what I mean when I refer to “other people” and their moral 
status. I assume that, in the vast majority of cases, others experience 
severe suffering in extremely negative ways “similar” to how I would 
experience such suffering myself. Secondly, I assume that a person’s 
subjective experiences have significant immanent value for that per-
son. Thirdly, I assume my subjective experiences to be valuable in and 
of themselves; restated, my subjective experiences hold objective value.7 
Combining assumptions one and two, I conclude that the immanent 
negative value of my own severe suffering would be extremely sig-
nificant for me. Combining assumptions two and three, I conclude 
that, objectively, each person’s subjective experiences have significant 
immanent value. Now I will make an empirical claim: with a given 
amount of assistance, the extremely negative subjective experiences of 
the severely suffering can be improved incomparably more than my 
significant, yet not as extremely negative or positive, subjective expe-
riences. Combining conclusions one, two, and the empirical claim, 
I finally conclude that, morally, since I ought to take actions that do 
good for what holds significant value, as a relatively affluent person 
I have an obligation to help those who suffer severely to the point of 
marginal utility.
My argument does not rely directly on a bird’s-eye-view of morality, 
or irrationally following one’s emotions, or most tenets of consequen-
5 Here, I answer “[t]he justificatory problem...of satisfactorily answering the 
question ‘why be moral?’” My approach “is reductionist in a pretty straightforward 
sense: it derives moral reasons from non-moral ones.” 
6 I wish to differentiate myself from the view, espoused by David O. Brink and T.H. 
Green, that “individual human beings are mere fragments of a larger social whole.” 
7 For more on immanent (intrinsic) value, see Zimmerman.
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tialism. Instead, it reasons from widely accepted premises to support 
the first conclusion (that one’s capacity is proportionate to one’s obli-
gation), the second conclusion (that distance is unimportant), and the 
third conclusion (that one’s obligation persists whether or not others 
also have that obligation) in Singer’s Strong Principle. Though I will 
more rigorously defend my argument in later work, it offers, even 
now, a more explicit justification for Singer’s Strong Principle than he 
provides himself. Our duty is indeed to perform actions of extreme 
altruism; that is, those of us who are relatively affluent ought to assist 
those who suffer from terrible, yet preventable, disease and poverty 
until we are near their level of suffering, too.
Epilogue
An abstract position like the one I’ve taken in this paper can be so 
counterintuitive that it seems highly implausible even if it has no 
glaring philosophical flaws. To better understand such an argument, 
philosophers often consider it with less abstraction by representing 
it with one or more thought experiments. A complex philosophical 
argument can be evaluated through multiple linked thought experi-
ments. With ethical thought experiments, I find it helpful to consider 
myself as one of the actors and to narrate the experiments in the first 
person; this method respects the intuitive fact that moral decisions 
often feel personal. Below, I put forward a narrative of interrelated 
thought experiments that, I hope, makes Singer’s Strong Principle 
more intuitively acceptable. 
Out of nothingness, I was called into being, a floating man, in a dark 
sky high above the Earth. There was no wind, my limbs were splayed, 
and my body was so calm that I could not even perceive my own 
breathing or heartbeat. I had no physical experience; I discovered a 
great joy in being free from the pains or pleasures of experience. Still, 
I was somehow aware of my own existence; it seemed that my “self ” 
arose out of my consciousness, unprovoked. In this moment of real-
ization, however, I felt the air that buoyed me up suddenly give way, 
and I plummeted down from the heavens.8 
8 This thought experiment is adapted from Avicenna’s 9th-century thought experi-
67
et al.: Full Issue, Special Issue 2, Fall 2018
67
I plunged into ocean depths and opened my eyes. They burned with 
salt as my body was gripped by cold. Water rushed into my nose; a 
chill shivered up my spine. I writhed my way upwards and, when I 
surfaced, I coughed out water between gasps for air. Across the starlit 
waters, I glimpsed land nearby. I made my way toward it. During 
this swim, I reminisced about the peace I had felt as a floating man; 
this peacefulness had been upended by my plunge. Despite this, I 
did not feel my sense of self fade as my physical experiences intensi-
fied—it merely found new forms of expression (in the consideration 
of my surroundings). Lost in these reflections, I did not notice the 
water turn brackish, and was thoroughly surprised when I reached 
the banks of an estuary. I stood, waded ashore, and began to walk 
upstream.
At dawn, I perceived a building in the distance. As I got nearer, I saw 
that the building was a medical clinic. I decided to enter and inquire 
as to where I might be, but, before I reached the door, it swung open 
and a doctor sprung out to greet me. “You must be tired from trav-
eling,” she said; she then sat me down and fetched me a muffin and 
a glass of water. There were five half-dead patients in the clinic, and 
they all stared at me with gaunt faces and ghostly eyes. They seemed 
intrigued by me. 
When the doctor returned with my water, I asked her if she could 
save the patients’ lives. She responded: “Each is in need of an organ 
transplant; one needs lungs, one intestines, one a liver, one a pancre-
as, and one a heart.” Then she watched me with expectation, as if I 
would suggest what to do next. But I sat mute. Surprised, she contin-
ued: “You ought to know that I will do what’s right.” 
I stared at her timorously; she leaned toward me and grabbed me by 
the arm. Reacting to the unexpected strength in her grasp, I leapt to 
my feet and asked her what she was playing at. She simply stared at 
me and said, in measured tones, “You must sacrifice yourself! As the 
Good Book says, ‘We, as human beings, are part of a social organism; 
the social self establishes what is moral, in that right actions do good 
ment of “The Floating Man.” 
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for the social self.’ My five patients, who are respected leaders in their 
respective communities, will fully recover after their transplants. You 
can exchange your one life for five others. Your family will not suffer 
from worry that you were murdered; they will think that you died on 
a pleasurable adventure through the wilderness. When you sacrifice 
yourself, you will do a great good.” 
All five patients nodded. Though they were in desperate need and the 
doctor’s argument appeared sound, I still could not convince myself 
intuitively that I ought to sacrifice myself to save those patients. So I 
protested to the doctor, and to the patients, that I had a moral sta-
tus as a conscious being which protected me from the obligation to 
sacrifice my own life. When I saw their looks of disgust, despair and 
rage, I realized that they might murder me (without my consent), so I 
turned, fled the clinic, and ran into the bush.
After I had hiked far enough to make my escape, I came upon a beau-
tiful glade. I looked to the sky above and was overcome with the same 
joy in existence that I had experienced up there: “There is value just 
in being, and morality must respect being; all humans, in their being, 
have this intrinsic value, which gives each of us profound moral sta-
tus,” I reflected. As I reached the end of this thought and dropped my 
gaze earthward, I was surprised by a sharp cry. As I reflexively turned 
toward the noise, I saw a small boy crawl out from behind a nearby 
rock, grab a handful of grass, and eat the grass—all while cautiously 
watching me. He looked to be nearly dead from starvation. 
I imagined how he must feel, and I saw that my opportunity to help 
him applied to my recent reflections: “It would be very morally bad 
to allow this being, who holds such great intrinsic value, to suffer,” I 
told myself. I ran over to him, and he told me quietly that he would 
quite like some apples to eat from the tree above, but he didn’t have 
the strength to climb it. Without delay, I clambered far up into the 
branches to reach the fruit, then dropped several apples to the ground 
for him. 
When I climbed down and walked over to him, I saw that, though 
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he was famished, he ate the apples very slowly. As he ate, I naively 
told the boy that, since I had come into existence a short time ago, I 
was ignorant of his society. He did not find this peculiar; rather, he 
reached a hand toward me, grabbed my own, and drew me over to sit 
down next to him. He then recounted for me a history of the world, 
as he knew it—a narrative which lasted into the hours of darkness. 
Afterwards, he fell asleep beneath the apple tree; I could not sleep, so 
I gazed at the stars and thought of what questions I would ask the boy 
in the morning. 
At dawn, I fetched for us more apples for breakfast. When I saw that 
the boy’s appetite was sated, I asked him if he knew of many other 
people who severely suffered as he did. He answered, “In my society, 
very many, perhaps one in five.” I then asked about the four out of 
five people who did not suffer so. What did they do for the suffering? 
He replied, “Those people give people like me apples, but only out 
of generosity. Sometimes they give money to organizations, called 
charities, that feed us.” I asked him if he considered me to be one of 
these people, and he answered perceptively, “It cannot be so. For you 
did not give me those apples out of generosity.” 
I told him that he was right, that I felt obliged to help him and not 
generous in doing so. Furthermore, until the time came when I would 
snap out of existence like I had snapped into it, I would consider my 
greatest obligation to be to aid anyone who suffered severely. I would 
help as many as I could, even people I would never meet, because 
they each must have intrinsic value—in their own existence and ex-
periences—similar to my own; I would help until to help would lead 
me to severely suffer or risk death.
Extreme altruism is intuitive if one, as a relatively affluent person, 
knows people who severely suffer. Without personal connections, 
though, our intuition tells us that we are not obligated to help those 
we do not know. If actions consistent with extreme altruism are not 
intuitive, does that mean that they ask too much of moral agents? If 
we learn that our intuitions are misguided, should we still let them 
decide our moral actions?
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